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This paper examines the effect of U.S. food aid on conflict in recipient countries. To establish a causal
relationship, we exploit time variation in food aid caused by fluctuations in U.S. wheat production
together with cross-sectional variation in a country's tendency to receive any food aid from the United
States. Our estimates show that an increase in U.S. food aid increases the incidence, onset and duration
of civil conflicts in recipient countries. Our results suggest that the effects are larger for smaller scale
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nancy.qian@yale.edu“We are unable to determine whether our aid helps or hinders one or more par-
ties to the conﬂict... However, it is clear that the losses – particularly looted
assets – constitutes a serious barrier to the eﬃcient and eﬀective provision of
assistance, and can contribute to the war economy. This raises a serious chal-
lenge for the humanitarian community: can humanitarians be accused of fueling
or prolonging the conﬂict in these two countries?” — Humanitarian Aﬀairs Ad-
visors for Medecins Sans Frontiers (MSF) Amsterdam writing about Chad and
Darfur (Polman and Waters, 2010, p. 105).
1 Introduction
Humanitarian aid in general, and food aid in particular, is one of the key policy tools used
by the international community to help alleviate hunger and suﬀering in the developing
world.1 However, the eﬃcacy of humanitarian aid, and food aid in particular, has received
increasing criticism, especially in the context of conﬂict-prone regions. Aid workers, human
rights observers and journalists have accused humanitarian aid of being not only ineﬀective,
but of actually promoting conﬂict (e.g., Anderson, 1999; de Waal, 1997 and Polman and
Waters, 2010). LeRiche (2004) argues that “despite being widely known, the utilization
of the humanitarian aid system as a logistical support system for war is one of the most
overlooked constituent tactics of modern warfare. As such, it has not received adequate
research or public attention”.
The qualitative evidence points to aid stealing as an important mechanism. Humanitar-
ian aid is particularly easy for armed factions and opposition groups to appropriate since it
is physically transported over long distances, often through territories only weakly controlled
by the recipient government. Reports indicate that up to eighty percent of aid can be stolen
en route (Polman and Waters, 2010, p. 121). Even when aid reaches its intended recipients,
it can still be appropriated or “taxed” by armed groups, against whom the recipients are typi-
cally powerless. This misappropriated aid is then used to fund conﬂict. Much to the concern
of aid watchers, such accounts are not isolated but have been documented in numerous con-
texts: e.g., Afghanistan (2001 - present), Western Sahara (1950s), the Democratic Republic
of Congo (1971 - present), Ethiopia (1974-91), Eritrea (1972-74, 80-81), Israel (1950s), Iraq
(1992), Liberia (1993-2003), Rwanda (1994-2008), Sierra Leone (1991-2002), Somalia (1991-
present), Sri Lanka (1983-2009), Sudan (1983-2005) and the former Yugoslavia (1992-95)
(Polman and Waters, 2010).
1Food aid is the main component of humanitarian aid and is also an important part of economic aid
generally. For example, according to data from USAID, among the countries and years in our sample
(non-OECD countries between 1972 and 2006), 29.5 percent of U.S. economic aid was food aid.
1Although the grave nature of these accounts warrant the immediate attention of aid
donors, it is diﬃcult to redesign aid policy without systematic evidence of the impact of
existing policies. In particular, a question of ﬁrst-order importance is whether the qualitative
accounts are representative of the average eﬀect of humanitarian aid or whether they capture
the eﬀect within a set of extreme cases. Unfortunately, our current understanding remains
limited (Pillai, 2000, p. 197). Our study attempts to ﬁll this gap by providing a rigorous
estimate of the causal impact of food aid, the most important component of humanitarian
aid, on conﬂicts in recipient countries. It aims to answer several important questions: What
is the average eﬀect of food aid on conﬂict? What types of conﬂicts are aﬀected? Are the
eﬀects more or less prominent in certain contexts?
The main diﬃculty in empirically estimating the impact of food aid on conﬂict arises
from reverse causality and joint determination. Furthermore, the direction of the bias is
diﬃcult to predict ex ante. On the one hand, the fact that food aid and conﬂict are more
likely to be present during times of political and economic crises suggests that the OLS
estimates of the impact of food aid on conﬂict may be biased upwards. On the other hand,
the possibility that donor countries condition food aid on characteristics correlated with low
levels of conﬂict may cause OLS estimates to be biased downwards.2
To overcome these issues, we develop a novel identiﬁcation strategy for estimating the
impact of U.S. food aid on conﬂict. Our analysis exploits two sources of variation. First, we
exploit plausibly exogenous time-variation in U.S. wheat production, which is mainly driven
by weather shocks.3 Due to U.S. price support policies for American wheat producers, the
U.S. government accumulates reserves during high production years. In the following year,
much of the surplus is then shipped to developing countries as food aid. In the data, we
observe that U.S. wheat production is positively correlated with U.S. food aid shipments in
the following year. Second, we exploit cross-sectional variation in a country’s likelihood of
being a U.S. food aid recipient, which we measure as the proportion of years that a country
receives a positive amount of U.S. food aid during the 35 years of our study, 1972-2006. By
also using this cross-sectional variation, we are able to control for time-varying factors with
the inclusion of region-year ﬁxed eﬀects. Thus, we instrument for the amount of food aid
received by a country in a year with the interaction of last year’s U.S. wheat production
and the likelihood that a country was a U.S. food aid recipient. Our baseline estimates
2In addition, it is possible that conﬂict and food aid receipts are both outcomes of a third omitted
factor such as the strategic objectives of the aid donor. For example, during the 1960s and 1970s, the
U.S. government supported South Vietnam’s war against North Vietnam by giving the South Vietnamese
government enormous amounts of food aid, which could be monetized and used to fund the war (Kodras,
1993). In this case, the positive correlation between U.S. food aid receipts and conﬂict in South Vietnam
would confound the eﬀect of food aid with the eﬀect of U.S. strategic objectives.
3In a previous version of the paper, we use weather conditions in wheat producing regions of the U.S.
directly to instrument for U.S. food aid. In this version, we use U.S. production as an instrument because it
is easier to interpret the ﬁrst stage and reduced form coeﬃcients. The resulting 2SLS estimates for the two
methods are very similar. For brevity, we do not report the earlier estimates in this version of the paper.
They are available upon request.
2also include country ﬁxed eﬀects, which control for all time-invariant diﬀerences between
countries, including the main eﬀect of the likelihood that a country was a U.S. food aid
recipient; as well as region-year ﬁxed eﬀects, which control for changes over time that aﬀect
countries within each region similarly. Our identiﬁcation strategy relies on the interaction
term being exogenous conditional on these ﬁxed eﬀects (and the set of additional baseline
controls that we describe below).
Our strategy follows the same logic as a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator. For example,
the reduced form estimate compares the diﬀerence in conﬂict between years following high
U.S. wheat production and years following low U.S. wheat production between countries
that regularly receive U.S. food aid and countries that rarely receive U.S. food aid.
There are a few potential concerns related to the excludability of our instrument. First,
the main driving force of the time variation in U.S. wheat production, U.S. weather con-
ditions, may be correlated with weather conditions in aid-recipient countries, and thereby
inﬂuence conﬂict through channels other than U.S. food aid. To address this, we directly
control for the weather conditions of recipient countries. Second, U.S. production shocks
are potentially correlated with global wheat prices, which may aﬀect conﬂict in recipient
countries. In practice, this is not a serious problem because U.S. government price stabi-
lization policies cause U.S. wheat prices to be very stable over time. The data show that
global wheat prices are essentially uncorrelated with U.S. wheat production in the time-
series. Nevertheless, we cautiously control for region-speciﬁc time ﬁxed eﬀects to capture
region-speciﬁc changes in wheat prices over time. We also control for the possibility that
changes in global wheat prices may aﬀect recipient countries diﬀerently depending on the
extent to which they are producers or importers of cereals.
Our main outcomes of interest are measures of the incidence of conﬂict with more than 25
combat deaths in a country and year. We separately examine the incidence of all conﬂicts,
civil conﬂicts and inter-state conﬂicts. The analysis uses an annual panel of non-OECD
countries between 1972 and 2006. The OLS estimates of the impact of U.S. food aid on
conﬂict are negative, small in magnitude and statistically insigniﬁcant for all forms of con-
ﬂict. By contrast, the 2SLS estimates identify a large, positive and statistically signiﬁcant
impact of U.S. food aid provision on the incidence of civil conﬂict, but no eﬀect on the
incidence of inter-state conﬂict. The estimates imply that increasing U.S. food aid by 1,000
metric tons (MT) increases the incidence of civil conﬂict by 0.38 percentage-points. For a
hypothetical country that receives the sample mean of U.S. food aid - approximately 27,600
MT - and experiences the mean incidence of conﬂict - 17.6 percent, the estimates imply that
increasing food aid by ten percent increases the incidence of conﬂict by approximately 1.14
percentage-points. This increase is equal to six percent of the mean of conﬂict.
To better understand how food aid can aﬀect conﬂict, we undertake two additional
tests. First, we examine which types of conﬂict are most impacted by U.S. food aid by also
estimating the impact of food aid on the incidence of large-scale armed conﬂicts, deﬁned as
3conﬂicts involving 1,000 or more combat deaths. We ﬁnd that the eﬀect of U.S. food aid
is much smaller for large-scale conﬂicts than for the baseline measure, which includes all
forms of civil conﬂict, both small and large. This ﬁnding is is consistent with descriptive
accounts of humanitarian aid being appropriated by small-scale rebel groups or refugee
warriors to fund their military activities. Second, we decompose the incidence estimates by
separately examining civil conﬂict onset and duration. We ﬁnd that U.S. food aid increases
the incidence of civil conﬂicts by increasing both the probability of their onset as well as
their duration.
A potential caveat for interpretation comes from the possibility that U.S. food aid may
crowd out food aid from other countries or other forms of aid. Hence, U.S. food aid could
increase conﬂict due to a reduction in these other forms of aid, rather than an increase in
U.S. food aid. We explore this alternative interpretation, which has drastically diﬀerent
policy implications, by directly examining the eﬀects of U.S. food aid on: (i) other forms
of aid from the United States, (ii) food aid from other countries, and (iii) total oﬃcial
development assistance (ODA) from all countries. We ﬁnd no evidence that these other
types of foreign aid respond to U.S. food aid and therefore conclude that it is unlikely that
our results are due to aid crowd-out.
Having provided estimates of the average impact of U.S. food aid on conﬂict, we then turn
to an examination of whether the impacts are more or less prominent in certain contexts.
We ﬁnd suggestive evidence that food aid causes fewer conﬂicts in countries with low levels
of ethnic fractionalization and with well-developed transportation infrastructure, measured
by road density. The latter result is particularly interesting because it is consistent with
numerous accounts of food aid being stolen by armed factions during transit. The results are
consistent with it being easier for aid deliveries to circumvent road blocks and other attempts
at theft when there are more alternative routes for reaching the targeted population.
Our ﬁndings contribute to several literatures. First, they add to the debate about the
general impacts of foreign aid.4 Studies in this literature face similar identiﬁcation challenges
as our study.5 Our use of donor-country shocks to instrument for aid provision follows a
similar logic as Werker, Ahmed and Cohen (2009) and Ahmed (2010), who exploit oil price
shocks and the fact that wealthy oil-rich donors tended to favor muslim nations to estimate
4See for example, Burnside and Dollar (2000), Easterly (2003), and Svensson (1999). For studies focusing
speciﬁcally on the impacts of food aid, see Lavy (1992), Pedersen (1996), Kirwan and McMillan (2007),
Levinsohn and McMillan (2007), Quisumbing (2003) and Yamano, Alderman and Christiaensen (2005).
5The beneﬁts of foreign aid for recipient countries is a much studied and controversial subject. Prominent
economists, such as Jeﬀrey Sachs (2006), present many case studies of the success of aid, and Stern (1974)
argues that rich countries are morally obligated to provide aid to assist in the development of poor ones.
However, critics such as Bauer (1975) argue that foreign aid not only does not help, but hurts development.
Recent academic studies are more nuanced and focus on the question of whether foreign aid can be eﬀective
in good policy environments. On one hand, studies such as Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Svensson (1999)
ﬁnd that aid can be eﬀective in good policy environments. On the other hand, others, such as Easterly
(2003), argue that there is no evidence for the eﬀectiveness of foreign aid. Other studies that question the
eﬀectiveness of aid include Boone (1996) and Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004). The main challenge for
these studies has been in estimating a causal impact of aid.
4the impact of foreign aid on various macro-economic outcomes. Although they do not
examine conﬂict as an outcome, our ﬁnding that aid can have adverse eﬀects is broadly
consistent with their ﬁnding that aid has no eﬀect on economic growth (Werker, Ahmed
and Cohen, 2009) or that aid reduces institutional quality (Ahmed, 2010). Our ﬁnding that
aid is partly determined by changes in U.S. domestic production links our study to existing
studies that ﬁnd that aid is often determined by the strategic or economic needs of donor
countries (e.g., Ball and Johnson, 1996; Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Kuziemko and Werker,
2006; and Nunn and Qian, 2010).
A small number of papers examine the impact of foreign aid receipts on civil conﬂict.
Our ﬁnding that aid can increase conﬂict is consistent with the recent study by Besley and
Persson (2011), which ﬁnds that increased oﬃcial development assistance (ODA) associated
with UN Security Council membership during the Cold War increases the incidence of civil
wars in recipient countries. It is also consistent with Crost, Felter and Johnston (2011),
which ﬁnds that across municipalities within the Philipinees, eligibility for a large World
Bank funded foreign aid program is positively correlated with conﬂict causalities. Our
study diﬀers from these works in its focus on food aid, which may have diﬀerent eﬀects on
conﬂict relative to foreign aid generally.6 In our focus on a speciﬁc form of aid, our study is
similar to the recent study by Dube and Naidu (2010), which ﬁnds a positive relationship
between U.S. military aid and paramilitary violence across regions within Columbia.
Finally, our study is closely related to a large empirical literature examining the deter-
minants of conﬂict, which is reviewed by Blattman and Miguel (2010). In particular, in
establishing causality, our study is similar to recent studies such as Miguel, Satyanath and
Sergenti (2004), Dube and Vargas (2009), and Bruckner and Ciccone (2010) that develop
clever strategies to identify the causal impact of income shocks on civil conﬂict. Our re-
sults complement these studies by providing additional evidence on the determinants of civil
conﬂict.7
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses U.S. food aid policy and how
food aid can aﬀect conﬂict. Section 3 describes our identiﬁcation strategy and estimating
equations. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents our 2SLS estimates. Section 6
oﬀers concluding remarks.
6Not all studies of the impacts of foreign aid ﬁnd that aid increases conﬂict. (Collier and Hoeﬄer, 2002)
ﬁnd that total ODA has no eﬀect on conﬂict globally, while (de Ree and Nillesen, 2009) ﬁnd that within
total ODA reduces conﬂict. The diﬀerence in ﬁndings across all studies examining foreign aid and conﬂict is
most likely due to diﬀerent empirical strategies. In addition, the ﬁndings in our study may also diﬀer from
the ﬁndings of (Collier and Hoeﬄer, 2002) and (de Ree and Nillesen, 2009) because we examine a speciﬁc
type of aid rather than total ODA.
7The literature has thus far tended to focus on determinants such as ethnic divisions (e.g., Alberto Alesina
and Easterly, 1999; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005), income (e.g., Dube and
Vargas, 2009; Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti, 2004), institutions (e.g., Ahmed, 2010; Besley and Persson,
2011), propaganda (e.g., Yanagizawa-Drott, 2010), foreign aid (e.g., de Ree and Nillesen, 2009; Dube and
Naidu, 2010), trade (e.g. Martin, Mayer and Thoenig, 2008) and commodity prices (e.g., Collier and Hoeﬄer,
2004; Ross, 2004; Guidolin and Ferrara, 2007; Bruckner and Ciccone, 2010; Bazzi and Blattman, 2011).
52 Background
2.1 Food Aid and Conﬂict
U.S. food aid is delivered to recipient countries in the form of food that is typically trans-
ported to needy populations through semi-permanent food-aid centers or refugee camps.
Aid watchers most frequently point to theft by armed factions on the ground as the primary
mechanism through which food aid and other types of humanitarian aid promote conﬂict.
Food aid is regularly appropriated by militia groups or other armed factions during
its distribution. Unlike many other types of foreign aid, food aid and humanitarian aid
need to be transported across territories that the recipient country government often has
little control over. This makes food aid a particularly attractive target for armed factions,
especially in countries where the ruling government has limited control outside of the capital.
Armed factions can set up road blocks and “tax” aid agencies for safe passage. For example,
accounts from Somalia in the early 1990s indicate that as much as eighty percent of food
aid shipments were either looted, stolen or used as protection money. Stolen aid was then
traded for arms in neighboring Ethiopia (Perlez, 1992). In Afghanistan, aid organizations
in the province of Uruzgan gave over one-third of their food aid and agricultural support to
the Taliban. In Sri Lanka, up to 25 percent of the total value of aid was paid to the Tamil
Tigers by Dutch aid workers. In the former Yugoslavia, the UNHCR gave thirty percent
of the total value of aid to Serbian armed forces, and then more bribes to Croatian forces
to pass the respective road blocks in order to reach Bosnia (Polman and Waters, 2010, pp.
96-104).
The amount of theft can even exceed the value of the food, since convoy vehicles and
other equipment are also stolen. In 2008, MSF Holland, an international aid organization
working in Chad and Darfur, noted the strategic importance of these goods, writing that
these “vehicles and communications equipment have a value beyond their monetary worth
for armed actors, increasing their capacity to wage war” (Polman and Waters, 2010, p. 105).
One of the most well-established cases of humanitarian aid strengthening rebel groups
within a country occurred in Nigeria during the Nigeria-Biafra civil conﬂict of the late 1960s.
The rebel leader Odumegwu Ojukwu only allowed aid to enter the rebel controlled region of
Biafra if it was shipped on his planes. He charged aid agencies for the use of his airplanes
and ﬁlled the remaining space with arms and other military equipment. The shipments of
humanitarian aid allowed Ojukwu to circumvent the siege that had been placed on Biafra
by the Nigerian government. The food aid also allowed Ojukwu to feed his army, the
members of which oﬃcially qualiﬁed for international humanitarian relief because together
with the rest of the population, they were malnourished. Many suggest that the shipment
of humanitarian aid resulted in the Biafran civil conﬂict lasting years longer than it would
have otherwise (Polman and Waters, 2010, pp. 115-119).
Aid is not only stolen by rebel militia, but is also appropriated by the government, its
6military and government supporters. In Rwanda, in the early 1990s, government stealing of
food aid was so problematic that aid shipments were cancelled on several occasions (Uvin,
1998, p. 90). Governments that receive aid often target it to speciﬁc populations, excluding
opposition groups or populations in potentially rebellious regions. This has been noted to
increase hostilities and promote conﬂict. In Zimbabwe in 2003, the U.S.-based organization,
Human Rights Watch, released a report documenting examples of residents being forced to
display ZANU-PF Party membership cards before being given government food aid (Thurow
and Kilman, 2009, p. 206). In eastern Zaire, the leaders of the Hema ethnic group permitted
the arrival of international aid organizations only if they agreed to give nothing to their
enemies, the Lendu.8 Polman and Waters (2010) describe this phenomenon as common,
writing that “Aid has become a permanent feature of military strategy. Belligerents see to
it that the enemy is given as little as possible while they themselves get hold of as much as
they can” (Polman and Waters, 2010, p. 10).
Humanitarian aid workers are aware of the threat of aid theft and have developed a
number of strategies for minimizing the amount of theft en route.9 However, aid can still
fuel conﬂict even if it is successfully delivered to the intended populations. This commonly
occurs because the recipient populations either include members of rebel or militia groups,
or the recipients are “taxed” after receiving the aid. The most well-known example of this
occurred in the Hutu refugee camps near Goma following the Rwandan Genocide in 1994.
Hutu extremist leaders taxed Hutu civilians in the camps, and transferred the appropriated
aid to their militia. The aid (and physical protection) provided by refugee camps allowed
the Hutu extremists to regroup and rebuild their army. The Hutu militia were then able to
carry out raids into Rwanda, which contributed to both the First and Second Congo Wars
(Terry, 2002, ch. 5; Lischer, 2005, ch. 4).
For completeness, we discuss two additional channels through which food aid can, in
theory, aﬀect conﬂict. First, because food aid is fungible, it can increase government rev-
enues, which can promote political competition and conﬂict through the mechanisms of
many standard conﬂict models.10 In practice, this is unlikely since the value of food aid is
very small relative to total government revenues. For example, the average ratio of the value
of U.S. food aid relative to total GDP among observations in our sample ranges from 0.0016
to 0.0033, with the diﬀerence depending on whether transportation costs are included in
the food aid ﬁgures.11 Even among the observations with greater than median U.S. food
aid recipients, the average ratio only ranges from 0.0011 to 0.0066. Second, one may be
8In 2001, six aid workers who gave aid to the Lendu were murdered (Polman, 2009, p. 98).
9See Anderson (1999) for a summary of strategies used by aid workers to minimize aid theft and diversion.
10For example, see the works of Haavelmo (1954), Hirschleifer (1989), Garﬁnkel (1990), Grossman (1991),
Skaperdas (1992), Grossman (1999), Collier and Hoeﬄer (2002) and Besley and Persson (2011).
11The ﬁgure are constructed by calculating for each observation in the sample (i.e., non-OECD countries
form 1972 to 2006) the total value of U.S. food aid received divided by total GDP (both measured in nominal
U.S. dollars). We then calculate the average among the observations. The lower estimate assumes that 47
percent of the reported value of aid is the actual value of the commodities (see the discussion at the end of
Section 2.2). The higher estimate assumes that the full value consists of the value of the commodities.
7concerned that food aid causes conﬂict by increasing the supply of food, therefore reducing
the price of food in recipient countries (Pedersen, 1996; Kirwan and McMillan, 2007). The
eﬀect this has on conﬂict is a priori unclear. On the one hand, the price change decreases
agricultural incomes, which may reduce the opportunity cost of ﬁghting and increase conﬂict
(Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti, 2004). On the other hand, the decline in prices increases
the real income of citizens that are net consumers of these foods, i.e. non-agricultural work-
ers. Through the same mechanism, this may increase their opportunity cost of ﬁghting and
decrease the incidence of civil conﬂict. The net impact of these two contradicting forces is
ambiguous and depends on the relative importance and size of both groups, as well as other
factors determining whether the decline in agricultural incomes has a more adverse impact
than the increase in non-agricultural incomes.
Our discussion has focused on channels through which humanitarian aid can increase
conﬂict. It is important to recognize that there are many channels through which aid can
also decrease conﬂict. The most obvious channel is through increased economic development.
Alternatively, if conﬂict arises because of resource constraints, aid could reduce conﬂict by
reducing those constraints. Our study, which estimates the average causal eﬀect of food aid
on conﬂict, captures the net eﬀect of the positive and negative eﬀects of food aid on conﬂict.
2.2 The Determinants of U.S. Food Aid
International institutional arrangements for food aid were ﬁrst established during the 1950s.
By the 1970s, food aid represented approximately a quarter of Oﬃcial Development Assis-
tance (ODA). The main goal was to convert surplus food production from rich countries into
a useful resource in poor countries. The United States is the largest donor of food aid in the
world, accounting for approximately 58 percent of global food aid in 1990 and 64 percent in
2000 (Barrett and Maxwell, 2005, p. 12).12
U.S. food aid ﬂows to poor countries through several mechanisms, the most important
being Public Law 480 (PL 480), which was established under the Eisenhower administration
in 1954 and was later renamed the Food for Peace Program in 1962 by President John F.
Kennedy. All forms of food aid are procured by the United States Department of Agricul-
ture (USDA) and administered by either the USDA or the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID).13
12It is followed by the European Union countries, which in 2000, together accounted for approximately
seventeen percent of food aid ﬂows. The other major donors are Japan (six percent), Australia (three
percent) and Canada (three percent) (Barrett and Maxwell, 2005, pp. 10-13).
13U.S. food aid falls into four broad categories: Type I, Type II, Type III and other. Type I is administered
by the USDA and consists primarily of concessional loans with some grants for commodity exports. Titles
II and III programs are administered by USAID. Title II programs provide donations to meet humanitarian
and development needs. These are typically channeled through either recipient governments, NGOs or
multilateral organizations like the World Food Programme (WFP). Title III aid is sold to developing countries
which is then typically monetized to generate funds for development objectives. The ﬁnal category includes a
number of smaller programs including Food for Progress, Section 416(b), Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust,
and International Food for Education and Child Nutrition, all administered by the USDA (Barrett and
8Although U.S. food aid is comprised of many diﬀerent types of food, wheat constitutes the
largest proportion of aid. During the period of our study, 1972-2006, 63 percent (measured
by weight) of all cereal food aid shipments were wheat, and 58 percent of all food aid
shipments (cereals and non-cereals) was wheat. Given the quantitative importance of wheat
as a source of U.S. food aid, our study focuses on this crop. The advantage of focusing on
a speciﬁc crop, rather than examining aggregate aid, is that we are better able to identify
the relationship between production shocks and aid shipments.
Food aid is broadly determined by need since fewer developed countries are the primary
recipients of aid. However, on a year-to-year basis, food aid is, to a large extent, determined
by U.S. production (see e.g., Nunn and Qian, 2010). The USDA accumulates wheat in high
production years to stabilize prices for American farmers. This accumulated wheat is stored
and then shipped as food aid to poor countries. Given the time lag between harvest, storage,
and shipment, wheat harvested in year t, tends to arrive in recipient countries in the next
calendar year, t + 1. Therefore, in the empirical analysis, we characterize food aid received
in year t as a function of U.S. production in year t   1.
The authorization and administration of food aid programs under PL 480, which decides
the amount of food aid shipments to countries each year, is the outcome of a complicated set
of decisions made by a large number of government agencies (Ball and Johnson, 1996). In
the House of Representatives, food aid legislation is determined by the House Agricultural
Committee, the Foreign Aﬀairs Committee, and the Select Committee on Hunger. The
USDA determines what commodities are available and in what quantities. The Treasury
Department sets the terms of loans, the Oﬃce of Management and Budget determines if
funding is available, the Department of State assesses the political consequences, and USAID
implements the programs in the ﬁeld. Any inter-agency disagreements that may occur
are mediated by the Food Aid Subcommittee of the Developing Coordinating Committee
(Ruttan, 1993, p. 2). Our empirical analysis assumes that the decision making process results
in accumulated wheat reserves being regularly drawn down through increased shipments of
food aid that tend to be disproportionately greater for regular food aid recipients than for
irregular recipients. We will verify this assumption with the data.
A signiﬁcant proportion of the reported value of food aid consists of transportation costs.
Using data from 1999-2000, Barrett and Maxwell (2005, pp. 166-168) estimate that only 47
percent of the total value of food aid is the actual value of the commodity itself. The other
53 percent is accounted for by transportation costs. Part of the reason for the high shipping
costs is that U.S. legislation requires that at least 75 percent of food aid be shipped on U.S.
ﬂagged cargo ships that charge inﬂated rates.14 Because we are interested in measuring the
shipment of food aid to recipient countries exclusive of shipping costs, our analysis uses the
Maxwell, 2005, pp. 20-26). Note that our data on aid receipts only report total U.S. food aid. Therefore,
our analysis does not decompose food aid into diﬀerent categories.
14Barrett and Maxwell (2005, pp. 166-168) estimate that forty percent of the shipping costs is explained
by this shipping premium.
9quantity of food aid rather than its reported value. The former does not include the costs
of shipment while the latter does.
3 Empirical Strategy
Our main analysis examines the relationship between the incidence of conﬂict and food aid
receipts from the United States, which we characterize with the following equation:
Cirt = Firt + Xirt  + 'rt + i + "irt; (1)
where i denotes countries, r denotes geographic regions and t denotes years. The sample is
a panel of 134 non-OECD countries for the years 1972-2006. The sample period is limited
by the availability of food aid and conﬂict data.15 The dependent variable, Cirt, is an
indicator variable that equals one if there is conﬂict in country i and year t. The main
explanatory variable is the amount of U.S. food aid a country receives, denoted Firt. The
speciﬁcation includes country ﬁxed eﬀects, i, that control for time-invariant diﬀerences
across countries, and region-year ﬁxed eﬀects, 'rt, that control for changes over time that
aﬀect countries within a region similarly. The region classiﬁcation that we use is taken from
the World Bank and consists of the following groups: South Asia, East Asia and Paciﬁc,
Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa,
and Sub-Saharan Africa. Xirt is a vector of country-year covariates that we motivate and
discuss in detail as we present the results.
Note that following several studies on conﬂict, such as Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti
(2004), our main estimates do not control for a lagged dependent variable to avoid the Nickell
(1981) bias. However, as we show in Section 5.4, we obtain qualitatively similar estimates
when we control for a one-year lag of the dependent variable.
Assuming casual identiﬁcation,  is the eﬀect of an additional unit of U.S. food aid on
the incidence of conﬂict. A positive coeﬃcient, ^  > 0, indicates that, on average, an increase
in the provision of U.S. food aid increases the incidence of conﬂict in the recipient country.
Interpreting the OLS estimates of the eﬀect of U.S. food aid on conﬂict faces the dif-
ﬁculties of reverse causality and joint determination, discussed in the introduction of the
paper. To address these diﬃculties, we exploit two sources of variation. First, we use time
variation in U.S. food aid shipments arising from changes in U.S. wheat production. When
U.S. production is high, USDA price support policies generate an accumulation of reserves,
which increases the amount of food aid shipped to recipient countries in the subsequent
year. We argue that this source of variation is exogenous to factors that inﬂuence conﬂict
in recipient countries beyond U.S. food aid (conditional on the baseline controls that are
described below). We also exploit a second source of cross-sectional variation from a coun-
15The panel is not balanced as the number of countries in the world increase over time. The results are
similar if we restrict the sample to a balanced panel.
10try’s tendency to receive food aid from the U.S., measured by the fraction of years between
1972 and 2006 that a country is a recipient of U.S. food aid. This is motivated by the fact,
documented in Section 4, that regular aid recipients experienced greater increases in food
aid shipments following U.S. production booms.
The instrument for U.S. food aid is therefore the interaction between lagged U.S. produc-
tion and the tendency for a country to receive any U.S. food aid. All of our estimates control
for country ﬁxed eﬀects and region-year ﬁxed eﬀects. Our instrument, which is constructed
by interacting an arguably exogenous term (lagged U.S. wheat production) with one that
is potentially endogenous (the likelihood of a country to be a U.S. food aid recipient), can
be interpreted as exogenous since we directly control for the main eﬀect of the endogenous
variable (i.e., it is absorbed by the region-year ﬁxed eﬀects).16
An alternative strategy is to use (uninteracted) lagged U.S. wheat production to instru-
ment for U.S. wheat aid. The drawback of this strategy is that we are then unable to also
control for region-year ﬁxed eﬀects (or even year ﬁxed eﬀects). Given the potential impor-
tance of shifting U.S. foreign policies across regions, ex ante this is a signiﬁcant drawback.
Ex post, we ﬁnd that it makes little diﬀerence whether we instrument using only time vari-
ation from U.S. wheat production (and control for country-speciﬁc linear time trends) or
using the interacted instrument (and control for region-year ﬁxed eﬀects). For the sake of
rigor, our main results use the interacted instrument. The estimate with the uninteracted
instrument is reported in section 5.4.
The ﬁrst stage (and reduced form) of our 2SLS strategy is similar in spirit to a diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences (DD) estimation strategy, where we compare U.S. food aid receipts (and con-
ﬂict) between countries that frequently receive U.S. food aid to countries that rarely receive
U.S. food aid, in years after the U.S. experiences high levels of wheat production relative
to years following lower production levels. The main diﬀerence between our strategy and a
DD strategy is that the treatment in our study is continuous, allowing us to use all of the
variation in the treatment variable for our estimates.





+ Xirt  + 'rt + i + "irt; (2)
where the amount of U.S. food aid received by country i, in region r, during year t is denoted




t=1972 Dirt , where Dirt is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if
country i receives any U.S. food aid in year t. Thus, the amount of U.S. food aid receipt
is a function of the interaction of lag U.S wheat production and the tendency for a country
to be a U.S. food aid recipient during the period of our study, as well as all of the control
16The identifying assumption is that the “endogenous” variable and the outcome of interest are jointly
independent of the “exogenous” variable. For a more technical discussion, see section 2.3.4 of Angrist and
Krueger (1999).
11variables from the second-stage equation (1).
Recall that the causal interpretation of the 2SLS estimates assumes that conditional
on the controls, the interaction between lagged U.S. wheat production and a country’s
tendency to receive U.S. food aid only aﬀects conﬂict through the provision of U.S. food aid.
In principle, the excludability of our instrument could be violated if U.S. wheat production
impacts foreign conﬂict by aﬀecting the world price of wheat or other crops that substitute
for or are complements to wheat.17
In practice, this is not a serious problem for our estimates for several reasons. First, the
region-year ﬁxed eﬀects in our baseline equation ﬂexibly control for all year-to-year region-
speciﬁc changes and therefore account for any global or even regions-speciﬁc price changes.
For U.S. production-induced world price changes to violate the exclusion restriction, they
would need to have systematically diﬀerent within-region eﬀects on the outcome of interest
in a manner that is correlated with a country’s tendency to be a U.S. food aid recipient.
Nevertheless, to be cautious, our analysis addresses this possibility with additional controls
that capture diﬀerential responses of countries to global price changes. We discuss these
controls in detail in Section 5.
Second, during the period of our analysis, the data suggest that U.S. price stabilization
policies, which include the government’s accumulation of reserves, were quite eﬀective in
breaking the link between U.S. production shocks and price changes. Examining the rela-
tionship between total production and average wheat prices measured in real U.S. dollars
annually between 1972 and 2006, one ﬁnds a negative and marginally signiﬁcant relationship
(the correlation coeﬃcient is -0.30 with a p-value of 0.08).18 However, further examination
reveals that this is completely driven by two outlying observations, 1973 and 1974, two years
that experienced low wheat production and happened to coincide with the initial OPEC oil
shock (October 1973 to March 1974) that drastically increased oil and commodity prices.
Excluding 1973 and 1974, we ﬁnd no correlation between U.S. wheat production and wheat
prices. The correlation coeﬃcient is -0.07 with a p-value of 0.70. The lack of a relation-
ship between U.S. production and global wheat prices is also partly explained by the fact
that even though the U.S. is among the largest producers of wheat globally, it by no means
dominates global supply. For example, in 2000, the U.S. was the third largest producer of
wheat, after China and India, and it accounted for 10.3% of global production.
Another concern is that the estimated relationship between food aid and conﬂict may
be confounded by region-speciﬁc shifts in U.S. foreign policy during the time horizon of our
study.19 Most of these policy shifts should be absorbed by the region-year ﬁxed eﬀects.
17For recent evidence on the relationship between commodity prices and civil conﬂict see Angrist and
Kugler (2008), Dube and Vargas (2009), Bruckner and Ciccone (2010) and Bazzi and Blattman (2011).
18Data on U.S. wheat prices are from the FAO PriceSTAT (1991-2006) and FAO Price Archive (1973-
1990). The ﬁgures are the producer price per ton, measure in nominal U.S. dollars. The nominal prices were
converted to real prices using the U.S. CPI.
19For example, during the 1960s and 70s, food aid was primarily used to support South Vietnam (Saylor,
1977). During the Carter administration (1977-81), the focus shifted to alleviating hunger worldwide, causing
12However, to be cautious, we also include additional controls that are described in Section 3.
4 Descriptive Statistics
We now provide an overview of the data and their sources. Our primary outcome of interest,
the incidence of conﬂict, is constructed using data from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conﬂict
Dataset, where a conﬂict is deﬁned as the use of armed force between two parties that results
in at least 25 battle deaths in a year. We examine the occurrence of intra-state conﬂicts (i.e.
civil conﬂicts), inter-state conﬂicts and conﬂicts of all types. An intra-state conﬂict is deﬁned
as a conﬂict between a government and one or more internal opposition groups, without
intervention from other states. An inter-state conﬂict is deﬁned as a conﬂict occurring
between two or more states. The measure of all conﬂicts includes intra- and inter-state
conﬂicts, and also a small number of conﬂicts labelled by UCDP/PRIO as “extra-systemic”
or “internationalized” conﬂicts.20
Our measure of U.S. food aid is the amount of wheat aid, measured in thousands of metric
tons (MT), shipped to a recipient country in a year from the United States. The data are
from the Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) FAOSTAT database. By measuring
aid in terms of volume, we avoid the diﬃculty in aid valuation described in section 2.2.
Data on U.S. wheat production, which is used to construct our instrument, is reported by
the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Production is also measured in thousands of
metric tons.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the main variables used in our analysis. There
are many conﬂicts in our sample, which includes all non-OECD countries and all years from
1972 to 2006. Approximately 23 percent of observations, which are at the country and year
level, experience some type of conﬂict. Most of these are civil conﬂicts, and most periods
of conﬂict are periods of continued conﬂict (i.e., there is conﬂict in the preceding year).
Only eighteen percent of conﬂict incidences are new conﬂicts (i.e., there is no conﬂict in the
preceding year).
Although U.S. wheat aid is a small part of total U.S. wheat production (5.9% on average
over the sample period), it can be large from the recipient’s point of view. The average ratio
food aid to be much more broadly disseminated than in the previous decade (O’Loughlin and Grant, 1990).
At the same time, political needs in the Middle East caused the administration to shift large amounts of
food aid to countries in that region (Cathie, 1989). The Reagan administration (1981-89) sought to confront
the Soviet Union in the Third World during what is often called the “Second Cold War” (Halliday, 1986).
As a result, massive amounts of military assistance and food aid were shifted to Central America and the
Horn of Africa (Coneth-Morgan, 1990). After the Cold War ended, food aid again became more widespread.
In particular, Eastern European countries which used to be within the Soviet sphere of inﬂuence began to
receive U.S. food assistance. More recently, since 2000, countries in the Middle East have received more U.S.
food assistance, presumably because of U.S. political and military involvement in that region.
20Extra-systemic conﬂicts are conﬂicts between a state and non-state group that occurs outside of the
government’s territory. Internationalized conﬂicts are conﬂicts between a state and a non-state group with
intervention from another state. There are very few incidences of these two types of conﬂicts. Our estimates
are qualitatively identical if we exclude these conﬂicts from our measure of the incidence of any conﬂict.
13of wheat aid received from the United States relative to domestic wheat production among
observations in the sample is 2.05 and the average ratio of U.S. wheat aid to domestic cereal
production is 0.93.
The average country in our sample receives some food aid from the United States in 35
percent of the years between 1972 and 2006. Countries range from having never received
any food aid from the United States, such as Argentina, Venezuela and South Africa, to
countries that received some food aid from the United States every year, such as Honduras,
Haiti and Bangladesh.
Our instrumental variables strategy exploits the relationship between wheat production
in the U.S. and subsequent supplies of wheat aid to foreign countries. To illustrate this, we
report the bivariate relationships between wheat production, accumulated wheat reserves
and wheat aid shipments in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 shows a strong positive relationship
over time between the total production of wheat within the United States and the stock
of wheat reserves held by the government at the end of the same year (i.e., at beginning
of the following year). Higher wheat production is followed by higher reserves at the end
of the year. Figure 2 shows the relationship between the beginning-of-year wheat reserves
and the amount of wheat shipped as food aid in that year. We observe a remarkably strong
positive relationship. When there is a greater store of reserves at the beginning of the year,
more wheat is subsequently shipped as food aid. Together, Figures 1 and 2 show that more
production leads to greater reserves, which leads to more food aid being shipped overseas.
Note that we do not use U.S. wheat reserves to construct our instrument because reserves
are potentially endogenous to expectations of future aid shipments and to U.S. foreign policy.
Instead, we use U.S. wheat production, which we assume to be determined by exogenous
weather conditions in wheat producing regions of the United States, and is, therefore, the
exogenous component of wheat reserves that determines food aid.21
Our identiﬁcation strategy recognizes that the impact of increased U.S. wheat production
on food aid shipments diﬀers across recipient countries. Speciﬁcally, we allow for the fact
that countries that are frequent U.S. food aid recipients receive a disproportionate amount
of the surplus wheat following an increase in U.S. wheat production. To visualize this fact,
we divide the countries in our sample into two groups according to whether the frequency
with which a country receives any U.S. food aid during the sample period is greater or
less than the median value: Dir 7 0:29. The group of countries below the sample median
comprises the “irregular” aid recipients and the group above the sample median comprises the
“regular” recipients. For the two groups, we calculate, for each year, the average quantity
of U.S. wheat aid received by each country. We then plot the relationship between this
variable and the one-year lag of total U.S. wheat production over time. Figures 3 and 4
21We validated this assumption by directly using U.S. weather conditions as instruments for U.S. wheat
aid. The 2SLS results are very similar to those presented in this paper, but the ﬁrst stage and reduced form
coeﬃcients are more diﬃcult to interpret. For brevity, they are not reported in this paper, but are available
upon request.
14show that, over time, there is no correlation between lagged U.S. wheat production and food
aid shipments among the irregular recipients. In contrast, Figure 5 shows that there is a
strong positive relationship over time for regular recipients. To compare the magnitudes of
the slopes between the two groups, the y-axes in Figures 3 and 5 are constructed to have
the same scale. In Figure 4, we display the relationship for irregular recipients with a y-axis
that covers a smaller range than in Figure 5. The fact that we see no relationship with the
magniﬁed y-axis means that the smaller slope shown for the irregular recipients is not an
artifact of the lower average quantity of aid received by infrequent recipients.
The patterns shown in Figures 3-5 are consistent with our conjecture that when the U.S.
government allocates surplus wheat production across recipients, it ships a disproportionate
amount of the surplus to its regular aid recipients.22 The ﬁgures also help understand the
variation driving our ﬁrst stage estimates. Conceptually, the estimated coeﬃcient of the
instrument, the interaction between lagged U.S. wheat production and a country’s tendency
to receive any U.S. food aid, Pt 1  Dir, is similar to the diﬀerence between the slopes of
the lines shown in Figures 3 and 4 relative to Figure 5. Thus, one can easily see that the
ﬁrst stage estimate of the eﬀect of the instrument on U.S. wheat aid will likely be positive,
i.e. ^  from equation (2) is greater than zero.
Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the variation underlying our reduced-form estimates of the
eﬀect of lagged wheat production on conﬂict for regular and irregular U.S. aid recipients.
Again, there is a stark diﬀerence between the two groups. Figure 6 shows that there is
no relationship between lagged U.S. wheat production and conﬂict among infrequent aid
recipients, whereas Figure 7 shows that the relationship is positive for regular recipients.
The reduced form estimate of the eﬀect of the instrument on conﬂict is the diﬀerence in the
slopes shown in these two ﬁgures. Thus, Figures 6-7 show that the reduced-form estimate
will likely be positive.
Conceptually, the 2SLS estimates are the quotient of the reduced-form and ﬁrst-stage
estimates. Therefore, Figures 3-7 show that the instrumented eﬀect of U.S food aid on
conﬂict will most likely be positive. In the next section, we examine whether this is the case
in a regression framework where we introduce our baseline set of controls, which also allows
us to examine the statistical precision of the estimates.23
22We also observe similar relationships when we measure aid receipts and lagged U.S. production in
logs. This is also illustrated later in the paper when we test the robustness of our estimates to alternative
speciﬁcations and measure U.S. production and wheat aid receipts in logs. This means that the same
percentage increase in lagged U.S. wheat production results in a larger percentage increase in wheat aid
receipts for regular aid recipients relative to irregular recipients.
23Note that the estimated coeﬃcient in the regression analysis also diﬀers from the illustrated diﬀerence in




We begin the analysis by ﬁrst reporting the OLS estimates of equation (1), which are pre-
sented in panel A of Table 2. Column (1) reports estimates of the correlation between U.S.
food aid and the incidence of any conﬂict for a speciﬁcation that only includes recipient-
country ﬁxed eﬀects and region-year ﬁxed eﬀects. The OLS estimate of the impact of U.S.
food aid on conﬂict is very close to zero and statistically insigniﬁcant. In the remaining
columns of the table, we include additional covariates to control for factors that may be cor-
related with conﬂict, food aid shipments or U.S. wheat production. Since our 2SLS strategy
relies on weather-induced year-to-year variation in U.S. production, a potential concern is
that weather conditions in the wheat growing regions of the United States may be correlated
with weather conditions in recipient countries, which can have a direct eﬀect on conﬂict.24
To address this, in column (2), we control for twelve variables that measure the average
temperature in each month of year t and twelve variables that measure total precipitation
in each month of the same year. By controlling separately for weather in diﬀerent months,
we account for the fact that diﬀerent parts of the world have diﬀerent crops with diﬀerent
growing seasons, and hence, diﬀerent sensitivities to temperature and precipitation.25
A second concern is that variation in U.S. wheat production can aﬀect overseas con-
ﬂict through a channel other than food aid if U.S. production aﬀects international wheat
prices, which may, in turn, aﬀect conﬂict. The weak times-series relationship between U.S.
production and world prices discussed in Section 3, and the inclusion of region-year ﬁxed
eﬀects in our estimates suggest that this concern is unwarranted. Nevertheless, to be as
cautious as possible, we also control for the possibility that year-to-year price changes may
have diﬀerential eﬀects on countries within regions. For example, a country’s sensitivity
to changes in world prices may depend on the extent to which it imports, exports and/or
produces wheat or other cereals. Thus, we control for a country’s: (i) per capita net imports
of cereals and (ii) per capita production of cereals for each country, each interacted with
year ﬁxed eﬀects.26 To address the possibility that cereal import and production can be
outcomes of aid, we do not control for time-varying measures of each variable. Instead, we
calculate country averages for each variable and control for the interaction of the country-
24This is a particular concern given that past studies have found that weather shocks can aﬀect conﬂict
(e.g., Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti, 2004).
25The measures are constructed using country boundaries and monthly weather data measured across
grid-cells from the Terrestrial Air Temperature and Precipitation: 1900-2006 Gridded Monthly Time Series,
Version 1.10. The data reports daily mean temperature (measured in degrees Celsius) and daily mean
precipitation (measured in millimeters) with 0.5 degree by 0.5 degree (approximately 56 km by 56 km)
grid-cells globally for each month from 1900 to 2006. For documentation see Matsuura and Willmott (2007)
and Dell, Jones and Olken (2008) for a recent application.
26Cereal production and cereal imports and exports are from the FAO’s ProdSTAT and TradeSTAT
databases. Both are measured in thousands of metric tons. Population data are from the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators.
16speciﬁc measure with year ﬁxed eﬀects.27 These controls allow the impact of global wheat
prices, (which are absorbed by the year ﬁxed eﬀects), to diﬀer across countries depending
on the extent to which they produce or import cereals. Estimates after including the two
additional controls are reported in column (3).
An additional concern is that regular recipients of U.S. food aid (i.e., countries with a
high value of Dir) may be systematically diﬀerent from irregular recipients (with a low value
of Dir) in other ways that inﬂuence conﬂict. For example, regular recipients may also be
more likely to also receive U.S. military aid or other forms of U.S. economic aid (besides food
aid). If these diﬀerences vary systematically over time and across countries within a region,
then they will not be captured by our country and region-year ﬁxed eﬀects. We address
this possibility by controlling for year ﬁxed eﬀects interacted with: (i) the average annual
amount of per capita U.S. military aid received by a country during the sample period and
(ii) the average annual per capita amount of other forms of U.S. economic aid (net of food
aid).28 Column (4) reports estimates that also include these additional controls.
It is also possible that the regularity in which a country receives U.S. food aid, Dir,
aﬀects the extent to which weather shocks experience by a country aﬀects the incidence of
conﬂict within the country. Speciﬁcally, it is possible that the impact of adverse weather
shocks on conﬂict are weaker if a country regularly receives U.S. food aid. To control for this
possibility, we include the interaction of each of our twelve monthly temperature variables
and twelve monthly precipitation variables with the frequency in which a country to receive
food aid from the United States, Dir. The results with these additional controls are reported
in column (5) of the table.
The estimates of columns (2)-(5) show that the OLS correlation between U.S. food aid
and the incidence of conﬂict are always negative in sign, small in magnitude and statistically
insigniﬁcant. They are unaﬀected by the addition of controls. In columns (6) and (7), we
separately investigate the eﬀects on the incidence of civil and international conﬂicts. We
ﬁnd similarly small and statistically insigniﬁcant estimates.
5.2 First-Stage and Reduced-Form Estimates
The ﬁrst-stage estimates of equation (2) are shown in panel D of Table 2. These estimates
show that there is a strong positive correlation between the instrument and food aid ship-
ments. The ﬁrst stage F-statistics for the excluded instrument range from 13.8 to 20.1.
Thus, it is unlikely that our estimates are biased by weak instruments. In terms of magni-
tude, the estimated coeﬃcient in column (5) suggests that for a country that receives some
amount of food aid from the U.S. in every year of the sample period (i.e., Dir = 1), a 1,000
27Estimates from using contemporaneous or one-year lagged time-varying measures of production and
imports, each interacted with year ﬁxed eﬀects are virtually identical to the estimates reported in the paper.
They are available upon request.
28Aid data are from the USAID and population data are from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators. The ﬁgures are measured in 2007 U.S. dollars per person.
17MT increase in total U.S. wheat production increases the amount of food aid received in the
following year by 2.44 MT. As reported in Table 1, the average value of Dir in our sample is
0.35. Therefore, evaluated at the sample mean, a 1,000 MT increase in U.S. wheat produc-
tion is predicted to increase U.S. food aid shipments by 0:352:44 = 0:85 MT. Multiplying
this by the number of countries, 134, gives 114.4 MT, which is an approximate measure of
the predicted increase in total U.S. food aid shipments to the world that result from a 1,000
MT increase in U.S. wheat production.
To check that our ﬁrst-stage estimates are not confounded by spurious positive trends be-
tween U.S. wheat production and food aid shipments to U.S. food aid recipients, we conduct
a falsiﬁcation exercise and estimate alternative ﬁrst-stage equations where the instrument
is used to predict past food aid rather than future food aid. Columns (2) and (3) of Table
3 report estimates of two alternative speciﬁcations where the dependent variable is wheat
aid shipments one and two years before the year of the production shock. We ﬁnd no re-
lationship between our instrument and past U.S. food aid. The relationship is statistically
insigniﬁcant, negative, and very small in magnitude. These results support our identiﬁcation
assumptions.
As a check that our instrument does not violate the exclusion restriction by also af-
fecting recipient-country cereal production, we also examine the relationship between the
instrument and a recipient country’s per capita cereal production. The estimate, reported in
column (4) of Table 3, shows that the instrument is uncorrelated with foreign-country cereal
production. This ﬁnding is consistent with the existing empirical evidence, which generally
fails to ﬁnd a link between food aid and production (FAO, 2006, pp. 40-41, Abdulai, Barrett
and Hoddinott, 2005).
We report the reduced-form eﬀects of our instrument on the outcome variables of interest
in panel B of Table 2. For these regressions, we have multiplied the dependent variable by
1,000 for presentation purposes. The impact of the instrument on the incidence of all
conﬂicts and intra-state conﬂicts are positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the one percent
level. However, there is no impact on inter-state conﬂict. In addition, the estimates are also
very stable across the speciﬁcations reported in columns (1)-(5).
5.3 2SLS Estimates
Table 2 panel C reports 2SLS estimates of equation (1). Like the reduced form, the 2SLS
estimates remain stable as we introduce the baseline controls in columns (1)-(5). According
to the estimates using the full set of baseline controls reported in column (5), a 1,000 MT
increase in U.S. wheat aid increases the incidence of conﬂict by 0.47 percentage-points, an
eﬀect that is statistically signiﬁcant at the one percent level. Columns (6) and (7) show
that the impact on overall conﬂict is driven by an increase in intra-state conﬂicts and not
by inter-state conﬂicts.
The ﬁnding that food aid only aﬀects intra-state conﬂicts is consistent with the qualita-
18tive accounts that emphasize the impact of food aid on fueling local conﬂicts between rebel
groups and the government. Given the focus of the descriptive literature and our ﬁndings,
the remainder of our analysis focuses on intra-state conﬂicts.
To assess the magnitude of the implied eﬀect of aid on civil conﬂict, consider that the
sample mean of the incidence of civil conﬂict is 17.6 percentage-points (i.e., 0.176) and of
U.S. wheat aid is 27.6 thousand MT. Therefore, for a country at the mean level of U.S. wheat
aid, the estimate from column (6) implies that a ten percent increase (i.e., 2.76 thousand
MT) in U.S. food aid is associated with a 1.11 percentage-point increase in the incidence
of civil conﬂict, which is approximately six percent of the mean. Expressed in terms of
standard deviations, our estimates imply that a one-standard-deviation increase in food aid
will increase the incidence of civil conﬂict by 1.25 standard deviations.
Note that in addition to the 2SLS estimates, panel C also reports the Limited Infor-
mation Maximum Likelihood (LIML) estimates and their corresponding p-values, as well as
Conditional Likelihood Ratio (CLR) 95% conﬁdence intervals. The fact that the LIML esti-
mates and the mid-point of the CLR intervals are similar or higher than the 2SLS estimates
is consistent with our instruments being strong and the 2SLS estimates not suﬀering from
weak instruments bias.29
5.4 Robustness
We now check the robustness and sensitivity of the estimated impacts of U.S. food aid on
civil conﬂict. First, we examine the robustness of the ﬁndings to the inclusion of additional
controls that may aﬀect conﬂict and be correlated with food aid. These are shown in
Table 4. In column (1), we ﬁrst reproduce our baseline estimates, but with the smaller
sample size that results from the inclusion of additional control variables. The smaller
sample produces an estimate that is qualitatively identical to the estimate with the larger
sample.30 In columns (2) and (3), we control for GDP per capita, which has been found
to be an important determinant of civil conﬂict (Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti, 2004).
Since contemporaneous GDP is potentially endogenous to U.S. food aid, we either control
for lagged per capita GDP (reported in column (2)) or control for a country’s average real
per capita GDP over the sample period interacted with year ﬁxed eﬀects (in column (3)).31
In column (4), we address the possibility that a country’s level of democracy may aﬀect
both the extent to which it receives U.S. food aid and civil conﬂict by controlling for the
interaction of a country’s average “polity2” score (from the Polity IV database) during the
sample period and with year ﬁxed eﬀects.
29See Moreira (2003) for a discussion of how LIML estimates are less vulnerable to weak instruments bias
relative to 2SLS estimates and of how CLR intervals address the weak instruments problem in the case with
one endogenous regressor.
30All speciﬁcations reported in Table 4 use the same sample for which data for all control variables are
available. Allowing the number of observations to vary across the speciﬁcations yields qualitatively identical
results.
31The results are also robust to controlling for contemporaneous per capita GDP.
19In column (5), we consider the fact that the Cold War ended during the middle of our
sample and how this can inﬂuence our estimates. The region-speciﬁc year ﬁxed eﬀects absorb
the impacts of the Cold War and its conclusion if the impact of these changes were similar
across countries within a region. However, there remains the concern that the events may
have had diﬀerential eﬀects across countries within regions. Speciﬁcally, there is concern
that Soviet Cold War allies, which tend to be irregular recipients of U.S. food aid (e.g.
a low value of Dir), may have experienced a greater decline in conﬂict after the end of
the Cold War. In this case, a spurious decline of U.S. wheat production in the post-Cold
War era would bias our estimates towards ﬁnding that greater U.S. production increases
conﬂicts among regular U.S. food aid recipients relative to irregular recipients. This seems
unlikely because the data show no decline in U.S. production after the end of the Cold War.
However, to be as careful as possible, we address this concern explicitly by controlling for
the interaction of a post-Cold War indicator variable and Dir.
Finally, in column (6), we include all of the robustness controls simultaneously. The
estimated impact of U.S. food aid on civil conﬂict remains robust across all speciﬁcations:
the coeﬃcients for U.S. food aid remain positive, statistically signiﬁcant, and roughly the
same magnitude as the baseline estimate.
Next, we check the robustness of our ﬁndings to the use of alternative estimating equa-
tions. We begin by estimating an alternative speciﬁcation taken from Miguel, Satyanath
and Sergenti (2004). The speciﬁcation is the same as equation (1), but with country-speciﬁc
time trends rather than region-year ﬁxed eﬀects:
Cirt = Firt + Xirt  + 'iY eart + i + "irt: (3)
The vector of controls, Xirt, now includes the time invariant country controls (i.e., average
cereal production, cereal imports, U.S. military aid and U.S. economic aid), each interacted
with a time trend rather than time-period ﬁxed eﬀects. Column (1) of Table 5 reproduces
the baseline estimate for comparison, while columns (2) and (3) report estimates of equation
(3). Column (2) controls for a time trend that is the same for all countries, while column
(3) controls for country-speciﬁc time trends. In both cases, the estimated impact of U.S.
food aid on conﬂict remains positive, highly signiﬁcant, and roughly the same magnitude as
our baseline estimate.
We next check the robustness of our estimates to the use of an alternative instrument.
Since the exogenous source of the variation we exploit comes from time variation in U.S.
wheat production, we check that we ﬁnd similar estimates using only this source of variation,
i.e. using Pt 1 instead of Pt 1  Dir as an instrument. Equation (3) allows us to do this
since it imposes a functional form on unobserved time-varying factors rather than allowing
them to vary ﬂexibly over time. The 2SLS estimate of equation (3), using lagged U.S.
wheat production (only) as an instrument, is reported in column (4) of Table 5. The
point estimate is positive, statistically signiﬁcant and similar in magnitude to the baseline
20estimate. This ﬁnding shows that our main results are not biased by interacting lagged U.S.
wheat production with the regularity that a country receives U.S. food aid.32
In column (5), we alter our baseline equation (1) by including a one-year lag of the depen-
dent variable as a control to account for the potential persistence of conﬂict. This estimate
should be interpreted cautiously since it suﬀers from the Nickell (1981) bias. Nevertheless,
the fact that the estimate is robustly positive and statistically signiﬁcant is reassuring.
In columns (6) and (7), we show that we obtain qualitatively identical results if we nor-
malize U.S. food aid shipments by the recipient’s population or if we measure U.S. food
aid and U.S. production in natural logs rather than raw values. In both cases, the results
remain robust, and the magnitudes of the estimated impact of food aid, assessed by com-
paring standardized beta coeﬃcients, are similar. Thus, our results are not speciﬁc to our
choice of functional form.
5.5 Mechanisms
Thus far, our analysis has focused on estimating a causal relationship between U.S. food aid
and the incidence of civil conﬂict. We next explore potential mechanisms underlying these
results.
5.5.1 Onset and Duration
Our main outcome of interest, the incidence of civil conﬂict, reﬂects both the onset of new
conﬂicts and the continuation of existing conﬂicts. Anecdotally, there are many accounts
of food aid aﬀecting both onset and duration. For example, it has been argued that hu-
manitarian aid during the Nigeria-Biafran civil conﬂict (1967-1970) strengthened the rebel
leader Odumegwu Ojukwu, causing the conﬂict to last twelve to sixteen months longer than
it otherwise would have (Polman and Waters, 2010, pp. 114-122). More recently, observers
have argued that the aid given to Hutu extremists in refugee camps allowed Hutu leaders to
regroup, regain resources, and launch raids and attacks into Rwanda, leading to the First
and Second Congo Wars (Polman and Waters, 2010, pp. 13-34). To investigate the individ-
ual contributions of onset and duration to our ﬁndings, we separately estimate the impact
32One may also be concerned that our measure of a country’s average tendency to receive food aid includes
whether a country received any U.S. food aid in year t, which is related to the dependent variable in the
ﬁrst stage, the amount of U.S. food aid a country receives. We obtain virtually identical results if we use
alternative instruments where we interact lagged U.S. production with diﬀerent lagged moving averages of the
tendency to receive U.S. food aid, or with the average tendency of receiving U.S. food aid for all years except
for year t. In addition, we have also checked that our estimates are robust to using the interaction of the
tendency for a country to receive U.S. food aid and the lag of predicted U.S. wheat production, constructed
using county level data on U.S. wheat production and grid-cell level data on monthly temperature and
precipitation. Alternatively, we also instrumented for U.S. wheat aid directly with U.S. weather shocks.
Since, a priori, the probability that U.S. producers base production decisions on factors that aﬀect conﬂict
in poor aid-recipient countries is very low, it is not surprising that estimates when using the instruments
based on predicted production are very similar to our baseline estimates. For brevity, we do not describe
those estimates in detail or report them in the paper. They are available upon request.
21of food aid on the two outcomes.
To examine the impact on civil conﬂict onset, we rely on speciﬁcations from existing
studies that examine the determinants of the onset of civil conﬂict, deﬁned as the ﬁrst year
of a conﬂict episode or, equivalently, a conﬂict that occurs in a year following a year with
no conﬂict. We examine the determinants of the onset of civil conﬂict by ﬁrst using the
methodology from Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004), which removes observations that are periods
of continued conﬂict. Therefore, the sample only includes periods of no conﬂict and periods
of conﬂict onset.33 The 2SLS estimate of the impact of U.S. food aid on the onset of civil
conﬂict is reported in column (1) of Table 6. We ﬁnd a positive, but statistically insigniﬁcant
impact of U.S. food aid on civil conﬂict onset.
Column (2) reports estimates using an alternative speciﬁcation from Fearon and Laitin
(2003). Rather than excluding periods of continued conﬂict from the sample, the authors
include all observations and control for the incidence of civil conﬂict in the previous period,
which captures the mechanical relationship between the onset of civil conﬂict and the pres-
ence of conﬂict in the previous period. This alternative estimation strategy generates a point
estimate that is nearly identical to the estimate reported in column (1), but is much more
precisely estimated and statistically signiﬁcant. We interpret the ﬁndings from columns (1)
and (2) as evidence that U.S. food aid has a positive eﬀect on the onset of civil conﬂict.
Next, we examine the eﬀect of U.S. food aid on the duration of civil conﬂict. This follows
existing studies examining the duration of civil conﬂict, including Collier et al. (2004) and
Fearon (2004). The event of interest is the end of civil conﬂict.34 Let t index time, i index
civil conﬂicts and Ti  0 denote the length, in years, of the civil conﬂict (i.e., the duration).
The sample includes all country-years that are “at risk” for transition out of conﬂict, i.e. all
of the observations for which there was a civil conﬂict in the previous period. The estimation
uses the discrete hazard hit = Pr(Ti = t j Ti  t), where it is assumed that hit follows a
logistic distribution.35
Estimates of the impact of U.S. food aid on a country’s transition out of civil conﬂict
are reported in columns (3)-(5) of Table 6. Column (3) reports estimates only controlling
for the duration of the conﬂict up until period t 1. We allow the impact of duration on the
hazard rate to vary in a ﬂexible manner by including a third degree polynomial of duration.
In column (4), we also control for the time-invariant country characteristics from our set of
33Our speciﬁcation includes all baseline control variables.
34In this context, what one commonly refers to as “survival” in hazard models is continued conﬂict.
35In practice, the estimation relies on the insight from Allison (1984) and Jenkins (1995) regarding the
equality of the log likelihood function of discrete time hazard models and the standard likelihood function
for a binary regression model in which yit (an indicator that equals one if the country transitions out of
conﬂict at time t) is the dependent variable. The data are structured so that there is an observation for each
period that the country is at risk of transitioning out of the current state. The insight that the logit of the
discrete-time hazard model can be estimated using a logistic regression model is particularly useful since our
independent variable of interest, U.S. food aid, is instrumented with the interaction term using lagged U.S.
wheat production. We are thus able to estimate the impact of U.S. food aid on the hazard rate by applying
a control function approach that uses the two-step approach from Rivers and Vuong (1988). The two-step
approach is implemented by controlling for the ﬁrst-stage residuals in the second-stage logit regression.
22baseline control variables: a country’s average receipt of U.S. military aid over the period,
its receipt of U.S. economic aid net of food aid, its average import of cereals and its average
production of cereals. Column (5) reports estimates from a speciﬁcation that also controls
for region ﬁxed eﬀects. The estimates show that U.S. food aid increases the duration of civil
conﬂict, i.e. it reduces the probability that a civil conﬂict ends. In all three speciﬁcations,
the coeﬃcients for U.S. food aid are signiﬁcant at the one-percent level. The magnitude of
the estimates (marginal eﬀects evaluated at means) suggests that a 1,000 MT increase in
food aid shipments decreases the probability of the civil conﬂict ending in a year by between
0.48 and 0.61 percentage-points, a large eﬀect given that the sample mean for the probability
that a civil conﬂict ends is 0.188.
Overall, the results reported in Table 6 show that food aid increases both the onset
and the duration of civil conﬂicts. These ﬁndings are consistent with accounts of food aid
providing resources that can be used to both start civil conﬂicts and to prolong existing
conﬂicts.36
5.5.2 The Scale of Conﬂict
Descriptive accounts of humanitarian aid being an important source of funds for small-scale
rebel groups and “refugee warriors” suggest that aid may have a particularly large impact
on the incidence of smaller-scale conﬂicts. Our main conﬂict measures, which deﬁne conﬂict
incidence to be the presence of an armed conﬂict that causes 25 or more combat deaths
within a year, include both small and large conﬂicts. To investigate the extent to which our
main results are driven by small-scale conﬂict, we compare our main estimates to estimates
when using data from the Correlates of War (COW) Database, which only includes conﬂicts
that incur a higher threshold of 1,000 or more combat-related deaths in a year.
For comparison, columns (1)-(3) of Table 7 restate the baseline estimates for all con-
ﬂicts, intra-state conﬂicts and inter-state conﬂicts using the UDCP/PRIO. Columns (4)-(6)
presents estimates of the same speciﬁcations, but using the higher threshold COW data. We
continue to ﬁnd a positive impact of food aid on all conﬂicts and intra-state conﬂicts, and
no impact on interstate conﬂicts. The magnitudes of the positive impacts of food aid on all
conﬂicts and intra-state conﬂicts are signiﬁcantly smaller than the baseline estimates using
the lower conﬂict threshold UCDP/PRIO data.
36We have also examined the lag structure of our estimates. Our baseline speciﬁcation estimates the
eﬀect of contemporaneous U.S. food aid on conﬂict. However, wheat aid in the previous years may also
aﬀect conﬂict. This could occur if food aid is stored and then fought over by the opposing factions within a
country in the following year. Alternatively, food aid expropriated by rebel groups in a year may strengthen
them and increase their ability to ﬁght in the following year. We have investigated this by estimating
the eﬀect of one-year and two-year lagged U.S. food aid on the incidence of civil conﬂict. We ﬁnd that,
conditioning on food aid in the current period, food aid from previous years has no eﬀect on conﬂict. The
coeﬃcients are small in magnitude and are statistically insigniﬁcant. This suggests that the impact of food
aid on conﬂict is immediate, a result that is consistent with accounts of food aid generating resources for
militias that allow them to continue ﬁghting. For the sake of brevity, these results are not reported in the
paper. They are available upon request.
23Part of the diﬀerence between the coeﬃcients in columns (1)-(2) versus (4)-(5) is a
mechanical result of the fact that larger conﬂicts are less prevalent than small conﬂicts. (See
the descriptive statistics in Table 1.) However, even if we compare the estimated coeﬃcients
to the sample means, the impact of food aid on conﬂict continues to be smaller for larger-
scale conﬂicts. Similarly, if one also compares standardized beta coeﬃcients, which are
reported in Table 7 below the estimated coeﬃcients, the same conclusion is reached. For
example, while a one-standard-deviation increase in U.S. food aid increases the incidence
of small-scale intra-state conﬂicts by 1.25 standard deviations (column 2), it increases the
incidence of large-scale conﬂicts by only 0.74 standard deviations (column 5). Overall, these
ﬁndings are consistent with descriptive accounts that emphasize the theft of humanitarian
aid by small-scale militants and other similar armed groups.
5.5.3 Crowding-Out of Other Aid
Our interpretation of the main results is that U.S. food aid has a direct causal impact on
conﬂict in recipient countries. However, a possible alternative explanation is that food aid
aﬀects conﬂict indirectly by crowding out other types of aid. For example, other donor
countries or multilateral agencies may respond to an increase in U.S. food aid by reducing
their own aid provisions. If these other forms of aid reduce conﬂict, then this form of “crowd-
out” can explain why U.S. food aid increases conﬂict. Similarly, if the reduction in food aid
is large enough, then an increase in U.S. food aid could actually cause total foreign aid to
decline. Our results could, again, be explained by aid crowd-out if total foreign aid reduces
conﬂict. It is important to keep in mind that this does not undermine the validity of our
estimates of the causal eﬀect of U.S. food aid on conﬂict, but the mechanism of crowd-out
is very diﬀerent from the ones that motivated our study, and they have very diﬀerent policy
implications.
We explore this important alternative explanation by re-estimating equation (1) but
with other forms of aid provision as dependent variables. We ﬁrst examine the eﬀect of
U.S. wheat aid on total wheat aid provision (from all countries). If U.S. aid is crowding out
wheat aid from other countries, then we would expect to ﬁnd that a one-unit (i.e., 1,000 MT)
increase in U.S. wheat aid increases total food aid by less than 1,000 MT. Table 8 column (1)
reports this point estimate, which is 1.13 and statistically signiﬁcant. The point estimate,
which is very close to one, suggests that U.S. aid does not crowd out the provision of wheat
aid from other countries. Column (2) estimates the same regression but with cereals aid
from all countries, rather than wheat aid as the dependent variable. The point estimate
again shows that U.S. wheat aid does not crowd out food aid from other countries. The
ﬁnding that there is no crowding out of either wheat or cereals aid is also conﬁrmed by the
estimates reported in columns (3) and (4), which show that U.S. wheat aid has no impact
on the provision of wheat aid and cereal aid from non-U.S. donor countries.
We next turn to the possibility that U.S. food aid crowds out the provision of other
24types of aid by the U.S., such as economic aid or military aid. Columns (5) and (6) report
estimates of the eﬀect of U.S. wheat aid on U.S. military aid and U.S. economic aid (exclusive
of food aid). We ﬁnd that food aid has no eﬀect on these other types of aid and that there
is no evidence for this form of crowd out. To help assess the magnitude of coeﬃcients, the
mean of each dependent variable is reported in the ﬁrst row of the table. The estimated
coeﬃcients are small in magnitude (relative to the means), and statistically insigniﬁcant.
Columns (7) and (8) test whether U.S. food aid crowds out total foreign aid provision by
other countries. The columns report estimates of the impact of U.S. food aid on two measures
of total net Oﬃcial Development Assistance (ODA) from non-U.S. donors, both taken from
the Roodman’s (2007) Net Aid Transfers Dataset. The measure of ODA used in column
(7) includes loans and grants net of principal and interest payment on existing loans. The
measure used in column (8) is also net of cancelled “Other Oﬃcial Finance” (OOF) loans,
which are typically included as ODA (see Roodman, 2007 for further details). We ﬁnd no
evidence of aid crowd-out using either measure. The coeﬃcients in both speciﬁcations are
small in magnitude and not statistically diﬀerent from zero.
From these results, we conclude that our main results are not driven by the crowding
out of other types of food aid or foreign aid.
5.5.4 Crowding-Out of Domestic Production
We next turn to the question of whether U.S. food aid crowds out domestic production,
which could result in lower incomes and thereby increase conﬂict. A priori, we ﬁnd it
unlikely that our estimates are explained by this mechanism because our estimates are
identiﬁed from the short-term impacts of year-to-year variation in U.S. food aid provision.
For changes in domestic production to explain our ﬁndings, production decisions would need
to be made in anticipation of U.S. food aid shipments. This seems unlikely to be true in
practice since planting decisions are made months before the crops are harvested. Thus,
it seems unlikely that rural farmers in poor countries, often far from the national capital,
forecast changes in food aid receipts in the following year and then make plans based on
these forecasts. Nevertheless, to be cautious, we investigate this possibility in columns
(9) and (10) of Table 8, where we report estimates of the impact of U.S. food aid on the
recipient’s wheat and cereal production. The estimated impact is small in magnitude and
statistically insigniﬁcant. There is no evidence that U.S. wheat aid crowds out recipient
countries’ domestic food production.
5.5.5 Heterogenous Treatment Eﬀects
Our ﬁndings have shown that food aid, on average, increases the incidence, onset and du-
ration of civil conﬂict. We now explore whether there are certain environments in which
food aid does not have such adverse eﬀects by testing for heterogeneous impacts of food aid.
25The factors we examine are motivated by descriptive accounts and existing studies on aid
or conﬂict.
We begin by examining a country’s level of overall economic development, measured by
real GDP per capita. It is possible that because more-developed countries are generally
more stable and less prone to conﬂict, food aid has a weaker impact on conﬂict within this
group. We calculate each country’s average annual real per capita income between 1972 and
2006, construct an indicator variable for countries below the median level of average income,
and interact this with the measure of U.S. food aid, Firt. This allows the impact of food aid
on conﬂict to diﬀer for countries below and above the median value of average per capita
income. This second stage equation can be written as the following.
Cirt =  (Firt  Iir) + Xirt  + 'rt + i + "irt; (4)
where Iir is an indicator variable that equals one if country i of region r has an average
value of real per capita income between 1972 and 2006 that is below the median value in the
sample. The other variables are the same as in equation (1). Since the direct eﬀect of the
indicator variable Iir is absorbed by the country ﬁxed eﬀects, the only diﬀerence between
equations (1) and (4) is the interaction term Firt  Iir.
To establish causality, the main eﬀect of U.S. wheat aid, Firt, and the interaction term,
Firt Iir, are instrumented with the original instrument, Pt 1   Dir, and the interaction of
the original instrument with the indicator variable, Pt 1   Dir  Iir. The controls include










+3 (Pt 1  Iir)+Xirt +'rt+i+"irt: (5)
Note that the direct eﬀects of Dir and Iir, as well as their double interaction, Dir Iir, are
absorbed by the country ﬁxed eﬀects. As before, the direct eﬀect of Pt 1 is absorbed by
the region-year ﬁxed eﬀects. The ﬁrst-stage equation for the interaction term is identical to
equation (5) but with Firt  Iir as the dependent variable.
The instrumented second-stage results reported in column (2) of Table 9 show that the
impact of food aid on conﬂict is statistically similar for low and high income countries. The
estimated coeﬃcient for the interaction term is negative but statistically insigniﬁcant.37
We next examine political institutions, dividing countries in our sample according to
whether they have an average polity2 score over the period that is above or below the
sample median.38 This addresses the hypothesis that more democratic governments (i.e.,
those with a high polity2 score) are more accountable to citizens and therefore more likely
37We do not report the ﬁrst stage estimates for brevity. They are available upon request.
38The polity2 measure is taken from the Polity IV Database.
26to distribute aid in a way that does not promote conﬂict.39 For similar reasons, we also
distinguish between countries with civilian and non-civilian governments, again using the
median of the average measure over the sample period as a threshold.40 The results reported
in columns (3) and (4) show that the eﬀect of U.S. food aid is statistically similar across
countries with diﬀerent levels of democratization and countries with civilian vs. military
governments.
Given that internal conﬂict is often tied to within-country ethnic diﬀerences, we examine
whether the impact of food aid diﬀers depending on the ethnic diversity and ethnic polar-
ization of a country. We create interaction terms for countries with below median-levels of
ethnic diversity and below-median levels of ethnic polarization.41 The estimates reported in
columns (5) and (6) show that food aid has similar impacts across countries with diﬀerent
levels of ethnic polarization, but has a weaker impact on conﬂicts in countries with lower
levels of ethnic diversity The latter estimate is negative in sign and large in magnitude,
although it is only statistically signiﬁcant at the 15% level.
Next, we investigate the plausibility of ﬁrst-hand accounts that armed factions steal
aid during transit, often by setting up road blocks, and then use the appropriated aid to
feed soldiers and fund the ﬁghting. To do this, we hypothesize that road-blocks erected
by armed factions, as well as other similar forms of theft, are more successful in countries
where transportation networks are less developed. The eﬀectiveness of roadblocks for armed
factions decreases with the number of routes between the original location of aid and the
destination where aid is to be delivered. This is based on the logic that it is easier for aid
deliveries to circumvent road blocks if there are more alternative routes. Our measure of
transportation networks is the annual average kilometers of roads per capita over the sample
period.42 The estimates reported in column (7) show that food aid has a smaller impact on
conﬂict in countries with a more developed road network. The estimated interaction eﬀect
is negative and large in magnitude, although it is only statistically signiﬁcant at the 15%
level.
The last factor we examine is not a country characteristic, but a change in the global
political environment that occurred during the sample period. Motivated by studies that
ﬁnd evidence of diﬀering motives behind U.S. aid provision during the Cold War, relative
39See Besley and Persson (2008) for a theoretical discussion.
40The classiﬁcation of whether a country has a civilian government is taken from the “RegimeType” variable
from the Banks’ Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive, which reports if a government is wholly civilian,
mixed, military, or other. We create a dummy variable that equals one if the government is entirely civilian
and then calculate the average of this variable for each country over time. Note that the Banks dataset is
available up to 1999. Thus, we assume that the country mean for 1972-1999 is similar to the country mean
for the period of our study, 1972-2006.
41The measure of ethnic diversity is from Alesina et al. (2003) and the measure of polarization is from
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005). These measures are only available for one year for each country and
the year varies. See Alesina et al. (2003) and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) for detailed discussions.
42The measure is constructed as the average for the years 1990-2003 using data reported by the World
Development Indicators. Our estimates assume that the average for 1990-2003 is broadly similar to the
average for the period of our study, 1972-2006.
27to after the Cold War (e.g., Meernik, Krueger and Poe, 1998), we examine whether food
aid aﬀected conﬂict diﬀerently during the Cold War. The results, reported in column (8),
provide no evidence of a diﬀerential impact during the Cold War. The estimated coeﬃcient
for the Cold War interaction is small in magnitude and statistically insigniﬁcant.
Finally, in column (9), we include all interaction terms in the same regression, which
addresses the fact that many of the factors we have examined may be correlated. The esti-
mates conﬁrm the previous ﬁndings that food aid has similar eﬀects on conﬂict on countries
with diﬀerent levels of: income, democratization, civilian rule, ethnic polarization; and that
it has similar eﬀects during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods.
The diﬀerential eﬀect for low ethnic diversity countries remains statistically signiﬁcant,
although its magnitude is half as large as its estimated magnitude without the other inter-
actions also included (reported in column (6)). The estimated interaction eﬀect for road
density remains robust. The magnitude of the coeﬃcient is similar to the magnitude re-
ported in column (7), and it is now statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The sum of the
coeﬃcients for U.S. food aid and the interaction of U.S. food aid and the high road density
indicator variable (reported at the bottom of Table 9) is small and close to zero, which
implies that U.S. food aid has little eﬀect on conﬂict in countries with high road density and
our main results are primarily driven by countries with low road density. This is consistent
with the observation that food aid if often stolen in transit and used by armed factions to
feed troops and ﬁnance rebel activities.
6 Conclusion
Humanitarian aid is one of the key international policy tools for helping needy populations
in times of crises or for aiding those suﬀering from endemic poverty. In recent years, human-
itarian aid and, in particular, its main component, food aid, have increasingly come under
criticism. Observers argue that humanitarian aid not only fails to achieve its main goal of
improving the well-being of the target population, but it can actually harm the intended
beneﬁciaries by promoting conﬂict. This controversial topic has already sparked much dis-
cussion amongst aid watchers. However, to undertake systematic reform of food aid policy,
one requires rigorous empirical evidence on the average eﬀect of existing policies.
Our ﬁndings show that the concerns of critics are very real. By exploiting year-to-year
variation in wheat production in the United States, along with cross-country variation in a
country’s propensity to receive food aid from the United States, we show that, on average,
food aid promotes civil conﬂict. An increase in U.S. food aid increases the incidence, onset
and duration of armed civil conﬂicts in recipient countries. We show that our results are
not a result of U.S. food aid crowding out aid from other countries. We also ﬁnd that food
aid has a more adverse eﬀect on small-scale armed conﬂicts and in countries with a less
developed transportation network. These ﬁndings support qualitative accounts of food aid
28either being stolen during transport or being taken from target populations by small armed
groups that use the resources to fund conﬂict.
Our study is a small ﬁrst step towards the larger goal of understanding the tradeoﬀs
that exist for food aid and humanitarian aid policies. Ideally, one would like to examine
a broad range of outcomes that capture both the potential beneﬁts as well as the costs of
food aid. One set of important outcomes to study are those related to health, such as infant
and child mortality. Unfortunately, given existing data constraints, we are unable to do this
using our empirical strategy, which relies on year-to-year variation across a broad sample of
developing countries. For example, much of the the data currently reported by the World
Health Organization or the World Bank are constructed by interpolating between years for
which actual data are available. The real variation in the data generally is not year-to-year
and consequently it cannot be used with our empirical strategy.43
One would also like to better understand the speciﬁc mechanisms that cause the adverse
impact of food aid identiﬁed here. We attempt to do this to the extent possible given the
available data. But our measures are admittedly coarse, with the variation remaining at
the country-year level. We believe that collecting ﬁner-grained (e.g., subnational or project-
level) data is essential for future research on understanding the eﬀects of food aid.44
In interpreting our results, it is important to note that we only study the eﬀects of
one particular type of aid, food aid. This form of aid is very diﬀerent from other types of
foreign aid in that it (and many other forms of humanitarian aid) is delivered in-kind and is
therefore particularly vulnerable to being appropriated by armed factions during transport.
In contrast, much of foreign aid is transferred as money from the donor government to the
recipient government. Whether such types of foreign aid aﬀect conﬂict is beyond the scope
of our study and our results should not be extrapolated as evidence of the impacts of foreign
aid in general.
43In the future, one may be able to apply our strategy to a panel of health outcomes constructed from
the Demographic Health Surveys. The surveys began too recently to allow the construction of a suﬃciently
long panel for analysis today. Most of the Demographic Health Surveys (DHS) began in the mid-1990s.
These surveys record the completed fertility history of women age 15-49. Using this data for our analysis
faces two challenges. First, there are very few births from the 1970s and 80s, which means that currently
the resulting panel is too short for our statistical analysis. This can be addressed in the future when the
constructed panels will naturally be longer, assuming that U.S. food aid policy does not change and our
empirical strategy remains valid at that time. Second, the DHS samples are conditional on women being
alive during the year of the survey. Since conﬂict causes mortality, this raises the concern that DHS samples
are aﬀected by the incidence of past conﬂict.
44Two examples of recent studies taking a more micro-oriented approach (although not examining food
aid per se) are Crost, Felter and Johnston (2011) and Dube and Naidu (2010).
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Figure 2: U.S. Wheat Aid and Initial U.S. Wheat Reserves
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Figure 3: Average U.S. Wheat Aid and Lagged U.S. Wheat Production
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(coef = 0.000017, t = 0.24, N = 35, R2 = 0.00)
Figure 4: Average U.S. Wheat Aid and Lagged U.S. Wheat Production – Unscaled Y-Axis
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(coef = 0.000759, t = 2.05, N = 35, R2 = 0.11)
Figure 5: Average U.S. Wheat Aid and Lagged U.S. Wheat Production
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Figure 6: Average Civil Conﬂict Incidence and Lagged U.S. Wheat Production
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(coef = 0.00434, t = 4.28, N = 35, R2 = 0.36)
Figure 7: Average Civil Conﬂict Incidence and Lagged U.S. Wheat Production
– Regular Recipients: Dir  0:29
39Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Conflicts with 25+ battle deaths (from UCDP/PRIO):
Any Conflict 4240 0.219 0.413
Intra State Conflict 4240 0.176 0.381
Inter State Conflict 4240 0.028 0.165
Onset of Intra State Conflict (all observations) 4210 0.033 0.178
Onset of Intra State Conflict (observations that follow no-conflict only) 3509 0.039 0.195
Offset of Intra State Conflict (observations that follow conflict only) 707 0.188 0.391
Conflicts with 1000+ battle deaths (from COW):
Any Conflict 4240 0.155 0.362
Intra State Conflict 4240 0.142 0.350
Inter State Conflict 4240 0.022 0.146
U.S. Wheat Aid (1000 MT) 4240 27.63 116.38
Frequency of Receiving Any U.S Food Aid 4240 0.351 0.301
Lagged U.S. Wheat Production (1000 MT) 4240 59650 8610
Recipient Cereal Production (1000 MT) 4240 8500 37577
TABLE 1. Summary Statistics
Notes: An observation is a country and year. The sample includes 134 non-OECD countries for the
years 1972-2006.
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s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
(
f
o
r
 
a
l
l
 
p
a
n
e
l
s
)
4
2
4
0
4
2
4
0
4
2
4
0
4
2
4
0
4
2
4
0
4
2
4
0
4
2
4
0
B
a
s
e
l
i
n
e
 
S
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
P
a
r
s
i
m
o
n
i
o
u
s
 
S
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
L
a
g
 
U
.
S
.
 
W
h
e
a
t
 
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
 
(
1
0
0
0
 
M
T
)
 
x
 
A
v
g
 
P
r
o
b
 
o
f
 
A
n
y
 
U
.
S
.
 
F
o
o
d
 
A
i
d
L
a
g
 
U
.
S
.
 
W
h
e
a
t
 
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
 
(
1
0
0
0
 
M
T
)
 
x
 
A
v
g
 
P
r
o
b
 
o
f
 
A
n
y
 
U
.
S
.
 
F
o
o
d
 
A
i
d
N
o
t
e
s
:
A
n
o
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
i
s
a
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
a
n
d
a
y
e
a
r
.
T
h
e
s
a
m
p
l
e
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
s
1
3
4
n
o
n
-
O
E
C
D
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
f
o
r
t
h
e
y
e
a
r
s
1
9
7
2
-
2
0
0
6
.
T
h
e
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
d
a
r
e
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
d
i
n
t
h
e
t
a
b
l
e
b
y
Y
(
y
e
s
)
o
r
N
(
n
o
)
.
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
e
r
r
o
r
s
a
r
e
c
l
u
s
t
e
r
e
d
a
t
t
h
e
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
l
e
v
e
l
.
*
*
I
n
p
a
n
e
l
B
,
t
h
e
p
o
i
n
t
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
a
n
d
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
e
r
r
o
r
s
a
r
e
m
u
l
t
i
p
l
i
e
d
b
y
1
0
0
0
f
o
r
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
a
t
i
o
n
p
u
r
p
o
s
e
s
.
I
n
P
a
n
e
l
C
,
w
e
a
l
s
o
r
e
p
o
r
t
t
h
e
L
I
M
L
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
,
p
-
v
a
u
e
s
,
a
n
d
C
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
a
l
L
i
k
e
l
i
k
h
o
o
d
R
a
t
i
o
(
C
L
R
)
9
5
%
c
o
n
f
i
d
e
n
c
e
i
n
t
e
r
v
a
l
s
.
I
n
p
a
n
e
l
D
,
w
e
a
l
s
o
r
e
p
o
r
t
f
i
r
s
t
-
s
t
a
g
e
C
r
a
g
g
-
D
o
n
a
l
d
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
.
T
h
e
S
t
o
c
k
-
Y
o
g
o
 
c
r
i
t
i
c
a
l
 
v
a
l
u
e
s
 
(
w
i
t
h
 
a
 
5
%
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
c
e
 
l
e
v
e
l
)
 
a
r
e
 
8
.
9
6
 
a
n
d
 
1
6
.
3
8
 
f
o
r
 
1
5
 
a
n
d
 
1
0
%
 
m
a
x
i
m
u
m
 
b
i
a
s
 
i
n
 
s
i
z
e
,
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
.
A
.
 
O
L
S
 
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
B
.
 
R
e
d
u
c
e
d
 
F
o
r
m
 
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
 
(
x
 
1
0
0
0
)
*
*
C
.
 
2
S
L
S
 
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
D
.
 
F
i
r
s
t
 
S
t
a
g
e
 
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
U
.
S
.
 
W
h
e
a
t
 
A
i
d
 
(
1
0
0
0
 
M
T
)
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
 
(
f
o
r
 
a
l
l
 
p
a
n
e
l
s
)
:
41T
a
b
l
e
3
:
T
h
e
E
ﬀ
e
c
t
o
f
U
.
S
.
W
h
e
a
t
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
o
n
P
a
s
t
W
h
e
a
t
A
i
d
a
n
d
R
e
c
i
p
i
e
n
t
C
e
r
e
a
l
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
U
.
S
.
 
W
h
e
a
t
 
A
i
d
 
(
1
0
0
0
 
M
T
)
 
U
.
S
.
 
W
h
e
a
t
 
A
i
d
 
(
1
0
0
0
 
M
T
)
,
 
P
e
r
i
o
d
 
t
-
2
U
.
S
.
 
W
h
e
a
t
 
A
i
d
 
(
1
0
0
0
 
M
T
)
,
 
P
e
r
i
o
d
 
t
-
3
R
e
c
i
p
i
e
n
t
 
C
e
r
e
a
l
 
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
 
(
1
0
0
0
 
M
T
)
(
1
)
(
2
)
(
3
)
(
4
)
0
.
0
0
2
4
4
-
0
.
0
0
0
3
6
-
0
.
0
0
0
5
7
-
0
.
0
6
1
0
(
0
.
0
0
0
8
2
)
(
0
.
0
0
0
7
6
)
(
0
.
0
0
0
9
5
)
(
0
.
0
8
0
9
)
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
4
2
4
0
3
9
7
2
3
8
3
8
4
2
4
0
R
-
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
0
.
5
2
8
0
.
5
4
6
0
.
5
5
6
0
.
9
5
5
L
a
g
 
U
.
S
.
 
W
h
e
a
t
 
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
 
(
1
0
0
0
 
M
T
)
 
x
 
A
v
g
 
P
r
o
b
 
o
f
 
A
n
y
 
U
.
S
.
 
F
o
o
d
 
A
i
d
 
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
:
T
A
B
L
E
 
3
.
 
F
i
r
s
t
-
S
t
a
g
e
 
P
l
a
c
e
b
o
 
R
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
N
o
t
e
s
:
O
L
S
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
a
r
e
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
.
T
h
e
u
n
i
t
o
f
o
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
i
s
a
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
i
n
a
y
e
a
r
.
T
h
e
s
a
m
p
l
e
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
s
1
3
4
n
o
n
-
O
E
C
D
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
f
o
r
t
h
e
y
e
a
r
s
1
9
7
2
-
2
0
0
6
.
A
l
l
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
t
h
e
f
u
l
l
s
e
t
o
f
b
a
s
e
l
i
n
e
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
-
s
e
e
T
a
b
l
e
2
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
 
(
5
)
-
(
7
)
 
f
o
r
 
a
 
f
u
l
l
 
l
i
s
t
.
 
C
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
s
 
a
r
e
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
,
 
w
i
t
h
 
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
 
c
l
u
s
t
e
r
e
d
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
l
e
v
e
l
.
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T
h
e
E
ﬀ
e
c
t
o
f
F
o
o
d
A
i
d
–
R
o
b
u
s
t
n
e
s
s
t
o
A
d
d
i
t
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o
n
a
l
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o
n
t
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l
s
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a
s
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l
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(
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.
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.
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.
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.
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.
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.
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)
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0
.
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1
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)
(
0
.
0
0
1
1
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(
0
.
0
0
1
0
2
)
(
0
.
0
0
0
9
3
)
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o
n
t
r
o
l
s
:
A
l
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B
a
s
e
l
i
n
e
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
Y
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Y
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Y
L
a
g
g
e
d
 
l
n
 
r
e
a
l
 
p
e
r
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
 
G
D
P
N
Y
N
N
N
Y
A
v
g
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r
e
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p
e
r
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
 
G
D
P
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Y
e
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F
E
N
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Y
N
N
Y
A
v
g
 
P
o
l
i
t
y
 
S
c
o
r
e
 
x
 
Y
e
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r
 
F
E
N
N
N
Y
N
Y
C
o
l
d
 
W
a
r
 
x
 
A
v
g
 
U
.
S
.
 
F
o
o
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A
i
d
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N
N
N
Y
Y
L
I
M
L
 
p
o
i
n
t
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
0
.
0
0
3
1
2
0
.
0
0
3
2
5
0
.
0
0
2
6
9
0
.
0
0
3
1
1
0
.
0
0
2
6
4
0
.
0
0
2
4
7
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
0
.
0
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
0
.
0
0
1
0
.
0
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
C
L
R
 
9
5
%
 
I
n
t
e
r
v
a
l
 
[
L
o
w
e
r
 
b
o
u
n
d
,
[
0
.
0
0
1
3
9
,
[
0
.
0
0
1
4
4
,
[
0
.
0
0
1
0
6
,
[
0
.
0
0
1
4
0
,
[
0
.
0
0
1
3
4
,
[
0
.
0
0
1
2
3
,
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
U
p
p
e
r
 
b
o
u
n
d
]
0
.
0
0
6
9
2
]
0
.
0
0
7
4
4
]
0
.
0
0
6
0
3
]
0
.
0
0
6
7
9
]
0
.
0
0
4
7
8
]
0
.
0
0
4
4
7
]
F
i
r
s
t
 
S
t
a
g
e
 
F
-
S
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
1
5
.
9
2
1
4
.
8
5
1
6
.
5
5
1
6
.
4
4
2
8
.
8
7
3
0
.
7
1
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
3
4
8
2
3
4
8
2
3
4
8
2
3
4
8
2
3
4
8
2
3
4
8
2
R
-
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
0
.
3
8
4
0
.
3
9
0
0
.
0
3
7
0
.
1
0
3
0
.
0
7
1
0
.
7
0
2
N
o
t
e
s
:
2
S
L
S
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
a
r
e
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
.
T
h
e
s
a
m
p
l
e
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
s
1
1
3
n
o
n
-
O
E
C
D
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
f
o
r
t
h
e
y
e
a
r
s
1
9
7
2
-
2
0
0
6
.
T
h
e
s
m
a
l
l
e
r
n
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
(
f
r
o
m
1
3
4
)
i
s
d
u
e
t
o
m
i
s
s
i
n
g
d
a
t
a
f
o
r
t
h
e
a
d
d
i
t
i
o
n
a
l
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
.
U
.
S
.
W
h
e
a
t
A
i
d
i
n
y
e
a
r
t
i
s
i
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
e
d
b
y
U
.
S
.
w
h
e
a
t
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
i
n
y
e
a
r
t
-
1
x
t
h
e
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
o
f
r
e
c
e
i
v
i
n
g
a
n
y
U
.
S
.
f
o
o
d
a
i
d
d
u
r
i
n
g
1
9
7
2
-
2
0
0
6
.
A
l
l
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
t
h
e
f
u
l
l
s
e
t
o
f
b
a
s
e
l
i
n
e
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
-
s
e
e
T
a
b
l
e
2
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
(
5
)
-
(
7
)
f
o
r
t
h
e
l
i
s
t
.
Y
(
y
e
s
)
o
r
N
(
n
o
)
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
t
h
e
i
n
c
l
u
s
i
o
n
o
r
e
x
c
l
u
s
i
o
n
o
f
a
d
d
i
t
i
o
n
a
l
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
.
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
e
r
r
o
r
s
a
r
e
c
l
u
s
t
e
r
e
d
a
t
t
h
e
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
l
e
v
e
l
.
T
h
e
t
a
b
l
e
a
l
s
o
r
e
p
o
r
t
s
L
I
M
L
p
o
i
n
t
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
(
a
n
d
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
s
)
,
a
s
w
e
l
l
a
s
C
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
a
l
L
i
k
e
l
i
k
h
o
o
d
R
a
t
i
o
9
5
%
c
o
n
f
i
d
e
n
c
e
i
n
t
e
r
v
a
l
s
.
T
h
e
C
r
a
g
g
-
D
o
n
a
l
d
f
i
r
s
t
s
t
a
g
e
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
a
r
e
a
l
s
o
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
a
t
t
h
e
b
o
t
t
o
m
o
f
t
h
e
t
a
b
l
e
.
T
h
e
S
t
o
c
k
-
Y
o
g
o
c
r
i
t
i
c
a
l
v
a
l
u
e
s
(
w
i
t
h
a
5
%
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
c
e
 
l
e
v
e
l
)
 
a
r
e
 
8
.
9
6
 
a
n
d
 
1
6
.
3
8
 
f
o
r
 
1
5
 
a
n
d
 
1
0
%
 
m
a
x
i
m
u
m
 
b
i
a
s
 
i
n
 
s
i
z
e
,
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
.
 
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
:
 
I
n
c
i
d
e
n
c
e
 
o
f
 
C
i
v
i
l
 
C
o
n
f
l
i
c
t
T
A
B
L
E
 
4
.
 
R
o
b
u
s
t
n
e
s
s
 
o
f
 
2
S
L
S
 
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
 
t
o
 
A
l
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
v
e
 
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
R
o
b
u
s
t
n
e
s
s
 
a
n
d
 
S
e
n
s
i
t
i
v
i
t
y
 
S
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
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a
b
l
e
5
:
T
h
e
E
ﬀ
e
c
t
o
f
F
o
o
d
A
i
d
–
R
o
b
u
s
t
n
e
s
s
t
o
A
l
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
v
e
S
p
e
c
i
ﬁ
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
B
a
s
e
l
i
n
e
 
I
V
:
 
u
s
i
n
g
 
l
a
g
g
e
d
 
U
.
S
.
 
W
h
e
a
t
 
P
r
o
d
 
x
 
A
v
g
 
F
o
o
d
 
A
i
d
 
P
r
o
b
M
S
S
 
(
2
0
0
4
)
:
 
t
i
m
e
 
t
r
e
n
d
s
M
S
S
 
(
2
0
0
4
)
:
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
-
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
 
t
i
m
e
 
t
r
e
n
d
s
I
V
 
u
s
i
n
g
 
l
a
g
g
e
d
 
U
.
S
.
 
w
h
e
a
t
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
 
o
n
l
y
 
(
u
n
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
e
d
)
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
l
i
n
g
 
f
o
r
 
l
a
g
g
e
d
 
c
o
n
f
l
i
c
t
N
o
r
m
a
l
i
z
i
n
g
 
a
i
d
 
b
y
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
T
a
k
i
n
g
 
n
a
t
u
r
a
l
 
l
o
g
s
 
o
f
 
a
i
d
 
a
n
d
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
(
1
)
(
2
)
(
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)
(
4
)
(
5
)
(
6
)
(
7
)
U
.
S
.
 
W
h
e
a
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A
i
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M
T
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0
.
0
0
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1
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.
0
0
3
9
9
0
.
0
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0
.
0
0
3
6
2
0
.
0
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.
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.
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5
6
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.
0
0
1
6
0
)
(
0
.
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.
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0
.
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0
.
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0
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0
.
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.
0
7
8
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S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
i
z
e
d
 
b
e
t
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c
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
1
.
2
5
4
1
.
0
5
8
0
.
8
9
9
1
.
1
2
4
0
.
8
4
8
1
.
1
5
9
1
.
1
8
5
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
:
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
F
E
Y
Y
Y
Y
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R
e
g
i
o
n
-
Y
e
a
r
 
F
E
Y
N
N
N
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Y
L
a
g
 
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
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V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
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N
N
N
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N
T
i
m
e
 
T
r
e
n
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N
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N
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
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S
p
e
c
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n
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p
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l
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I
n
c
i
d
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n
c
e
 
o
f
 
C
i
v
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n
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c
t
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o
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S
L
S
e
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t
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t
e
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r
e
r
e
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o
r
t
e
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.
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h
e
s
a
m
p
l
e
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n
c
l
u
d
e
s
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4
n
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n
-
O
E
C
D
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
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o
r
t
h
e
y
e
a
r
s
1
9
7
2
-
2
0
0
6
.
I
n
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
(
1
)
-
(
3
)
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d
(
5
)
-
(
7
)
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U
.
S
.
W
h
e
a
t
A
i
d
i
n
y
e
a
r
t
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s
i
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
e
d
b
y
U
.
S
.
w
h
e
a
t
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
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o
n
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n
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e
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r
t
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x
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h
e
f
r
e
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n
c
y
o
f
r
e
c
e
i
v
i
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y
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.
S
.
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o
d
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i
d
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g
1
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.
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n
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o
l
u
m
n
(
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)
,
U
.
S
.
W
h
e
a
t
A
i
d
i
s
i
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
e
d
b
y
U
.
S
.
w
h
e
a
t
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
i
n
y
e
a
r
t
-
1
.
T
h
e
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
i
n
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
(
1
)
a
n
d
(
5
)
-
(
7
)
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
t
h
e
f
u
l
l
s
e
t
o
f
b
a
s
e
l
i
n
e
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
.
S
e
e
T
a
b
l
e
2
,
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
(
5
)
-
(
7
)
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o
r
a
l
i
s
t
.
T
h
e
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
i
n
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
(
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)
-
(
4
)
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n
c
l
u
d
e
t
h
e
s
a
m
e
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
,
b
u
t
w
i
t
h
e
a
c
h
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
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l
e
v
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l
c
h
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r
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c
t
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r
i
s
t
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c
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n
t
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r
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c
t
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i
t
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n
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r
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c
a
t
e
t
h
e
i
n
c
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f
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c
i
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t
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r
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c
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c
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e
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t
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c
i
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n
t
s
'
.
 
44T
a
b
l
e
6
:
T
h
e
E
ﬀ
e
c
t
o
f
F
o
o
d
A
i
d
o
n
C
o
n
ﬂ
i
c
t
O
n
s
e
t
a
n
d
D
u
r
a
t
i
o
n
C
o
l
l
i
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l
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i
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i
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.
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.
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.
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.
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c
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p
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r
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t
p
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c
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o
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c
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b
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.
I
n
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
(
1
)
a
n
d
(
2
)
,
t
h
e
d
e
p
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t
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a
b
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e
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c
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r
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l
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n
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r
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o
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a
c
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l
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o
t
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c
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c
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t
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n
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l
u
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e
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h
e
f
u
l
l
s
e
t
o
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b
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s
e
l
i
n
e
c
o
v
a
r
i
a
t
e
s
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S
e
e
c
o
l
u
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(
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-
(
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o
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a
b
l
e
2
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o
f
t
h
e
s
e
v
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r
i
a
b
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e
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.
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n
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r
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h
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t
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r
e
p
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r
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o
d
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o
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c
o
n
t
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n
u
e
d
c
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n
f
l
i
c
t
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r
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d
f
r
o
m
t
h
e
s
a
m
p
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c
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c
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c
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n
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c
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p
l
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c
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t
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z
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r
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r
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d
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c
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c
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l
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r
v
i
v
a
l
i
s
c
o
n
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n
u
e
d
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n
f
l
i
c
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h
e
c
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
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r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
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r
e
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r
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i
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l
e
f
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e
c
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e
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c
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l
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n
c
t
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o
n
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p
p
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s
e
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e
s
t
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p
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b
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c
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z
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d
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l
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n
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n
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.
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.
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.
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.
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.
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c
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.
0
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m
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t
h
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U
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0
0
0
 
C
o
m
b
a
t
 
D
e
a
t
h
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O
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o
t
e
s
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2
S
L
S
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
a
r
e
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
.
T
h
e
s
a
m
p
l
e
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
s
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4
n
o
n
-
O
E
C
D
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
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s
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o
r
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h
e
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i
d
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r
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r
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y
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p
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c
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n
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t
-
1
x
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v
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r
a
g
e
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o
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a
b
i
l
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o
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c
e
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v
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g
1
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A
l
l
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
t
h
e
f
u
l
l
s
e
t
o
f
b
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e
l
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n
e
c
o
n
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o
l
s
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e
e
T
a
b
l
e
2
c
o
l
u
m
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s
(
5
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r
a
c
o
m
p
l
e
t
e
l
i
s
t
.
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o
e
f
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i
c
i
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s
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e
 
r
e
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d
 
w
i
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h
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t
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n
d
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d
 
e
r
r
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s
 
c
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t
e
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d
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t
h
e
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n
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l
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c
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n
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t
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.
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c
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.
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.
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.
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.
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.
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c
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p
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c
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c
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0
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l
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p
l
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i
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h
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p
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e
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n
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l
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r
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l
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c
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b
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